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Implicit Pension Debt in the Middle East and North Africa:  
Magnitude and Fiscal Implications 
 
David A. Robalino 
 
Tatyana Bogomolova 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper breaks down the contingent liability of a mandatory pension system into two 
components:  the implicit pension debt and the pay-as-you-go asset.  It then estimates 
these two components for 12 pension schemes across six MENA countries and presents 
international comparisons.  The results show that implicit pension debts are large (in the 
order of 50% to 100% of GDP), often higher than the explicit public debt.  At the same 
time, the large majority of pension schemes have negative pay-as-you-go assets.  Under 
these circumstances, it is misleading to consider the implicit pension debt a contingency, 
as the government will have to finance it with almost certainty.  In the absence of a 
default the fiscal impacts are expected to be large.  The paper recommends including in 
the assessment of public debt sustainability the implicit liabilities of the mandatory 
pension system and the pay-as-you-go asset.           
 
ﺺّﺨﻠُﻣ 
 
ﻦﻴﻤﺴﻗ ﻰﻟإ ﺔﻴﻣاﺰﻟﻹا ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا ﺔﻤﻈﻧﻷ ﺔﻠﻤﺘﺤﻤﻟا تﺎﻣاﺰﺘﻟﻻا ﺔﺳارﺪﻟا ﻩﺬه ﻢﺴﻘﺗ : ﻂﻄﺨﻟ ﺔﻴﻨﻤﻀﻟا ﺔﻴﻧﻮﻳﺪﻤﻟا
ﻊﺒﻨﻤﻟا ﺪﻨﻋ ﻂﻴﺴﻘﺘﻟﺎﺑ تﺎﻋﺎﻄﺘﻗﻻا ﻦﻣ لﻮﺻﻷاو ،ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا . نﺄﺸﺑ ﻦﻴﻤﺴﻘﻟا ﻦﻳﺬه تاﺮﻳﺪﻘﺗ ﻊﺿﻮﺑ مﻮﻘﺗ ﻢﺛ12 
ﻣ ناﺪﻠﺑ ﻦﻣ ﺔﺘﺳ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺗ تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻣ ﺔﻄﺧﺎﻧرﺎﻘﻣ ضﺮﻋ ﻊﻣ ،ﺎﻴﻘﻳﺮﻓأ لﺎﻤﺷو ﻂﺳوﻷا قﺮﺸﻟا ﺔﻘﻄﻨتﺔﻴﻟود  . ﻦّﻴﺒُﺗو
 ةﺮﻴﺒآ ﺔﻴﻨﻤﻀﻟا تﺎﻴﻧﻮﻳﺪﻤﻟا نأ ﺞﺋﺎﺘﻨﻟا) ﻦﻴﺑ ﺎﻣ ﻞﺼﺗ ﺔﺒﺴﻨﺑ50 و ﺔﺋﺎﻤﻟا ﻲﻓ 100ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟا ﺞﺗﺎﻨﻟا ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺟإ ﻦﻣ ﺔﺋﺎﻤﻟا ﻲﻓ ( ،
ﺢﻳﺮﺼﻟا مﺎﻌﻟا ﻦْﻳّﺪﻟا راﺪﻘﻣ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺒآأ نﻮﻜﺗ ﺎﻣ ًﺎﺒﻟﺎﻏ ﻲهو .ﺔﻴﺒﻟﺎﻏ نأ ﺪﺠﻧ ،ﻪﺴﻔﻧ ﺖﻗﻮﻟا ﻲﻓو ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا ﻂﻄﺧ 
ﺔﻴﺒﻠﺳ ﻊﺒﻨﻤﻟا ﺪﻨﻋ ﻂﻴﺴﻘﺘﻟﺎﺑ تﺎﻋﺎﻄﺘﻗﻻا ﻦﻣ ﺎﻬﻟﻮﺻأ ُتﻻﺪﻌﻣ . رﺎﺒﺘﻋا ﻞّﻠﻀُﻤﻟا ﻦﻣ نﻮﻜﻳ ،عﺎﺿوﻷا ﻩﺬه ّﻞﻇ ﻲﻓو
 تﺎﻣﻮﻜﺤﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ ًﺎﺒﻳﺮﻘﺗ ﺪﻴآﺄﺘﻟﺎﺑ ﻲﻐﺒﻨﻳ ﻪﻧﻷ ﺔﺋرﺎﻄﻟا تﻻﺎﻤﺘﺣﻻا ﻦﻣ ًﺎﻋﻮﻧ ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا ﻂﻄﺨﻟ ﺔﻴﻨﻤﻀﻟا ﺔﻴﻧﻮﻳﺪﻤﻟا
ﺔﻴﻧﻮﻳﺪﻤﻟا ﻚﻠﺗ ﻞﻳﻮﻤﺗ.ًاﺮﻴﺒآ ﺔﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ ﺮﺛﻷا نﻮﻜﻳ نأ ﻊّﻗﻮﺘﻤﻟا ﻦﻣ نﺈﻓ ،داﺪﺴﻟا ﻦﻋ ﺰﺠﻌﻟا ﻞﺼﺤﻳ ﻢﻟ اذإو  .
 ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا ﺔﻤﻈﻧﻷ ﺔﻠﻤﺘﺤﻤﻟا تﺎﻣاﺰﺘﻟﻻا مﺎﻌﻟا ﻦْﻳّﺪﻟا ﻞّﻤﺤﺗ ﻰﻠﻋ ةرﺪﻘﻟا تاﺮﻳﺪﻘﺗ ﻦﻴﻤﻀﺘﺑ ﺔﺳارﺪﻟا ﻩﺬه ﻲﺻﻮﺗو
ﻊﺒﻨﻤﻟا ﺪﻨﻋ ﻂﻴﺴﻘﺘﻟﺎﺑ تﺎﻋﺎﻄﺘﻗﻻا ﻦﻣ لﻮﺻﻸﻟو ﺔﻴﻣاﺰﻟﻹا      .   
 
RÉSUMÉ 
 
Le document présente une ventilation du passif éventuel d’un régime de retraite 
obligatoire selon deux composantes : l’endettement implicite du régime de retraite et les 
actifs du régime fondé sur la répartition (« pay-as-you-go »).  Il estime ensuite ces deux 
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composantes pour 12 régimes de retraite de six pays de la région MENA et présente des 
comparaisons internationales.  Les résultats indiquent que l’endettement implicite des 
régimes de retraite est important (de l’ordre de 50 pour cent à 100 pour cent du PIB), et 
qu’il est souvent supérieur à l’endettement public explicite.  Parallèlement, la vaste 
majorité des régimes de retraite font montre d’actifs négatifs pour le régime fondé sur la 
répartition.  Dans ces circonstances, il est erroné de considérer l’endettement implicite 
des régimes de retraite comme un passif, étant pratiquement certain que le gouvernement 
devra le financer.  En l’absence de défaut, les impacts budgétaires sont anticipés 
importants.  Le document recommande d’inclure dans l’évaluation de la viabilité de la 
dette publique, les passifs implicites du régime de retraite obligatoire et les actifs du 
régime fondé sur la répartition.           
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1. Introduction 
The proper measurement and monitoring of the public debt and the total external 
debt of a country are essential for the efficient design of fiscal policy and the prevention 
of financial crisis.  There is an ongoing debate in terms of the most appropriate 
methodology to measure the level of these debts and assess their sustainability (see IMF, 
2004 for a discussion in the case of low-income countries, and a more general discussion 
on debt tolerance by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003).  In all cases, however, the 
implicit liabilities of the mandatory pension funds are excluded from the analysis.  At 
best, the implicit pension debt is treated as a contingent liability of the government and is 
not reported as part of the public debt.  Unfortunately, it can be shown that when the 
pension system is not solvent, a large component of the implicit pension debt is actually 
not “contingent.”  The probability that the government will have to repay – or default on 
this debt – is very close to one.  Excluding this non-contingent component from the 
assessment of public debt sustainability can therefore seriously bias the design and 
implementation of fiscal policy. 
The objectives of this paper are to describe the true nature of the contingent 
liability of the pension systems in selected MENA countries and asses its fiscal 
implications.  We start by breaking down the contingent pension liability into two 
components:  the implicit pension debt (IPD) and the so called pay-as-you-go asset (PA).  
We then estimate the value of these two components for 12 schemes across 6 MENA 
countries1 and benchmark the results against those observed in other countries.2  To 
assess potential fiscal implications, we compute the change in the fiscal balance 
necessary to reduce the debt/GDP ratio by a given fraction over some period of time, 
resulting from the inclusion of the IPD in the debt sustainability analysis. 
The core of the paper is organized in 4 sections.  Section 2 sets the analytical 
framework by presenting the traditional definition of public debt and characterizing the 
contingent liability of the mandatory pension system.  Section 3 describes the methods 
and the data used to estimate IPDs and pay-as-you-go assets.  Section 4 presents the 
results of the analysis and assesses fiscal impacts.  Section 5 concludes and 
discusses policy implications. 
2. Public Debt and Contingent Pension Liabilities 
The public debt, as defined in Government Financial Statistics of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), incorporates public and publicly guaranteed obligations of the 
central, municipal, and local governments -- as well as other public entities -- with non-
government institutions.  Although not included directly in the calculation of the public 
debt, the definition recognizes the existence of contingent liabilities of various public 
institutions (e.g., state owned enterprises, banks) as well as the pension funds.   In this 
                                                 
1 Countries have been selected on the basis of available information. 
2 The calculation of the IPD is based on the methodology developed in Holzmann et al. (2004), which 
normalizes assumptions to make results comparable across countries.   
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section we show why treating the implicit debt of the pension funds as a contingency can 
be misleading. 
In an earnings related pension system that is not fully funded, current promises to 
pay pensions (pension rights accrued to date) are backed by available reserves as well as 
future contributions net of future pension payments ensuing from these contributions – 
the so called pay-as-you-go asset.  The contingent liability of the pension funds, on the 
other hand, is often interpreted as the part of future obligations that, with some 
probability, cannot be covered by future revenues.    Formally, the contingent liability can 
be defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] tpct RALLECPL −−+= θθθ ;;; sw,,N,Nsp,,Nsw,,N ncpc ,   (1)   
where E is the expectations operator, Lc(.) gives the liabilities of the pension system with 
current contributors (Nc), which depend on current and future average wages by age (w), 
a vector of current and future survival probabilities by age (s), and the parameters of the 
system (θ); Lp gives the liabilities with current beneficiaries (Np), which depend  on the 
current distribution of pensions (p), survival probabilities, and system parameters (e.g., 
pension indexation mechanisms); and A(.) is the pay-as-you-go asset, which depends on 
current and new contributors  (Nn), as well as wages, survival probabilities, and system 
parameters; and  Rt represents current reserves.   The implicit pension liability (IPD) of 
the system, the accrued to date liability, is given by Lc(.) + Lp(.).   
In a solvent pension system one would expect the contingent liability to be equal 
to or less than zero.  In other words, the expected implicit pension liability net of reserves 
would be at least equal to the expected pay-as-you-go asset.  Any deviation from 
equilibrium would not be systematic, but rather the result of unexpected shocks.  Under 
some designs, automatic rules that adjust θ to changes in the demographic and economic 
environment could even eliminate the contingent pension liability.  In this case, the IPD 
net of reserves would be equal to the pay-as-you-go asset in all states of nature. 
When the pension system is insolvent, however, the expected contingent liability 
is positive.  That is, under average conditions, the IPD net of reserves would be above the 
pay-as-you-go asset.  At the extreme, it is possible to observe an expected pay-as-you-go 
asset which is negative.  Indeed, it can be shown that the pay-as-you-go asset is equal to 
the accrued to date pension liabilities (IPD) plus the present value of future cash-balances 
(which is the negative of the so called financing gap, FG, of the system).  Formally, over 
the infinite horizon, we have: 
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where c are contributions at time t, pe are pension payments accrued by the new 
contributions of current plan members; pn are pension payments accrued by the 
contributions of new entrants to the system, pp are pension payments to current 
beneficiaries, and pc are pension payments to current contributors for the pension rights 
that they have accrued to date. Hence, if the financing gap of the system is large enough 
(higher than the IPD), the pay-as-you-go asset of the pension system becomes negative.  
Basically, future contributions do not generate a surplus in present value that can be used 
to finance the IPD. On the contrary, the new contributions bring new liabilities that 
themselves cannot be financed by the system.  In other words, keeping the system open to 
new contributions worsens its long-term financial position.       
 
Having a negative pay-as-you-go asset has important fiscal implications because 
it implies that only general revenues can be used to finance the IPD.3  Governments can 
delay the use of general revenues by continuing to “borrow” contributions to pay 
pensions, but because these new contributions also bring new pension liabilities, the 
situation eventually becomes explosive.  Under these circumstances, the liabilities of the 
pension funds do not represent a contingency for the government but rather a real debt 
that, in the absence of default, sooner or later will need to be financed.  When this is the 
case, excluding the IPD from the analysis of fiscal sustainability of the public debt can 
lead to severely biased policy recommendations.   
The next two sections of this paper are concerned with the estimation of the IPD 
and the pay-as-you-go asset of pension systems in various MENA countries.   
3.  Methods and Data  
The implicit pension debt is defined here as the accrued-to-date liabilities, or the 
PBO (projected benefit obligation).  It is equal to the present value of the benefits the 
pension system will have to pay to its current participants (and their survivors) on the 
basis of their pension rights accrued prior to the year for which the IPD is calculated.  
The calculation of benefits is made on the basis of future wages (i.e., wages at the time of 
retirement).  Neither future contributions nor new pension rights are included in the 
calculation.   Thus, the IPD shows how much it would cost to discontinue the pension 
scheme and pay out all obligations (see Holzmann et al., 2004 for a review of various 
measures of pension liabilities). 
                                                 
3 Here we abstract from the existence of reserves.  As shown later these are usually very low relative to the 
level of the IPD. 
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Our estimates of the IPD are based on the World Bank PROST (Pension Reform 
Options Simulation Toolkit) model.  Given limited information in most middle and low-
income countries about the vesting period of current contributors and their turnover rates, 
when computing pension payments for new retirees PROST uses little information about 
“their past.”  Thus, it is not possible to differentiate between those future new retirees 
who are contributors today and those future new retirees who enrolled in the system at a 
latter date.  Similarly, in the case of future new retirees who are contributors today, it is 
not possible to distinguish between the part of the pension that is associated with rights 
accumulated to date, and pension rights accumulated through new contributions.  In 
essence, for all new retirees of age a at time t, PROST computes the pension on the basis 
of an estimate of the average length of service at retirement.  However, because the 
pension payments in year t are related to both pension rights accrued to the date of 
computing the IPD and pension rights resulting from new contributions (of current and 
new plan members), a mechanism is necessary to separate the two.  For simplicity, 
PROST increases the share of pension rights accrued from new contributions in direct 
proportion to time.  As an illustration, assume that the calculation of the IPD is made at 
time t=0, that the average retirement age is 55, and that the youngest age at which 
individuals join the system is 20.  PROST in this case infers that the pension payments to 
new retirees in year t=1 are all the result of contributions made during the last 35 (55-20) 
years (i.e., are related to the pension rights accrued to date by current contributors).  As t 
increases, however, the role of past years of contributions has to diminish.  Hence, for 
year t=2, PROST reduces the share of past years by 1/35 -- since pension payments to 
new retirees now can reflect on year of new contributions.  Similarly, in year t=3 the 
share of past years of contributions is reduced by 2/35 and by 3/35 in year t=4.  At some 
point in time, past years of contributions are no longer associated with the pension 
payments to new retirees, as these result entirely from pension rights accrued through 
new contributions.   
 
Formally, the accrued to date liability with current contributors is given by: 
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where NPy,g is the number of new retirees of sex g in year y, RA_NPt,g is the average 
retirement age of all new retirees of sex g in year t, EA is the age of the youngest 
contributor, ρ is the discount rate, and PV_NPy,g is the average present value at time y of 
the stream of pension payments made to new retirees of sex g between times y and T.  
For each of these new retirees the present value of the future pension payments is itself 
given by: 
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where a indexes the age of the individual, i indexes the income category, NB is the first 
pension payment to the new retiree, B represents the indexed pension at time y, and ma 
the mortality rate at age a.  A similar approach is used to allocate disability pensions. 
 
The method described above for the calculation of the implicit pension debt with 
current contributors has proven to provide a reasonable approximation of the “true” IPD 
in the case systems that have been in operation for over 20 to 30 years.  Thus, it is 
suitable for all pension schemes analyzed in this paper.  For younger systems, or systems 
that start from scratch, the methodology just described tends to overestimate the IPD, as 
too much weight is given the accrued rights of current contributors. 
 
The liabilities to current beneficiaries comprise liabilities to old age pensioners, 
disabled, survivors and orphans.  The IPD to current old age pensioners is calculated in a 
more precise way than to current contributors, by following the current age-sex cohorts of 
beneficiaries over time.  Formally, the IPD is defined by: 
 
∑ ⋅=
gia
gtiagtiat OAPOAPPVOAPIPD
,,
,,,,,,__ ,       (5)    
 
where PV_OAPa,i,t,g is the present value of the stream of pension payments to a pensioner 
of age a and sex g, in income category i (see equation 4); and OAPa,i,t,g is the number of 
these individuals.  A similar approach is used to compute the implicit liabilities of current 
disabled.  Obligations to survivors (widows/widowers and orphans) are estimated with a 
lesser precision. PROST assumes that the share of obligations to survivors in the total 
IPD to existing old age pensioners and disabled is the same as the share of survivor 
pension expenditures on total expenditures.    
Data and Assumptions 
We estimate the implicit pension debt and the pay-as-you-go asset for 12 pension 
systems across 6 countries in the region.  These countries have been selected on the basis 
of data availability.  In the context of a cross country analysis, it is essential to find the 
right balance between taking into account the idiosyncrasy of a country’s pension system, 
on the one hand, and the comparability of the results, on the other.  To this end, we 
follow the methodology and assumptions developed by Holzmann et al. (2004), which 
allows for international comparisons.  Below we describe the key data and assumptions 
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regarding demographic dynamics, coverage, retirement patterns, benefit formulas, the 
finances of the system, and the macroeconomy.   
Demography.  Population projections are important to compute the pay-as-you-go 
asset because they determine the number of scheme participants by sex and age.   The 
projections are based on information provided by the World Bank’s Population Unit 
regarding the initial population by age and gender, and projections of age-specific 
fertility and mortality rates for each country. In line with international trends, mortality 
rates are assumed to decrease over time resulting in growing life expectancy, while 
fertility rates gradually converge to reproduction level (see Table 1). Decreasing 
mortality and fertility rates result in population aging and growing system dependency 
rates. 
To follow the different cohorts of contributors and beneficiaries over time, 
nationwide mortality rates are applied to the members of all schemes.  This is because of 
the lack of mortality rates which are specific to plan members.  The use of nationwide 
mortality rates adds some bias to the projections as coverage rates are relatively low and 
those who participate in the system are generally middle and high income individuals 
(particularly in the case of civil servants) who are expected to have longer life 
expectancies.  This would underestimate the implicit pension debt. 
Contributors.  The initial number of contributors and beneficiaries and their 
distribution by age and sex are based on actual data provided by the respective pension 
funds.  The initial age distributions of contributors for all considered schemes are 
compared on Figure 1.  Private sector schemes are shown on the left-hand side chart, 
public sector schemes on the right-hand side.  In general, schemes for civil servants have 
a more mature population because often they were created first.     
 
Table 1:  Expected Dynamics of Life Expectancy and Fertility Rates 
 Base Year 2020 2040 2060 2075 
Life Expectancy at Birth      
Djibouti 42.5 49.8 59.3 67.6 71.7 
Iran 69.5 74.5 77.5 81.7 84.5 
Jordan 71.3 75.3 77.4 79.9 81.5 
Lebanon 70.3 74.0 76.8 79.9 82.8 
Morocco 68.1 71.9 74.5 77.3 79.6 
West Bank&Gaza 72.3 75.4 77.3 79.3 80.8 
Total Fertility Rates      
Djibouti 493% 314% 241% 221% 213% 
Iran 250% 211% 210% 208% 207% 
Jordan 350% 209% 208% 207% 207% 
Lebanon 225% 210% 209% 208% 207% 
Morocco 273% 213% 210% 209% 207% 
West Bank&Gaza 485% 309% 214% 210% 206% 
Source:  WB Population Unit. 
To project the stock of future contributors by age and sex it is assumed, for all 
schemes and all countries, that current population coverage rates by age and gender 
remain constant (see Figure 2).  This normalization is introduced to facilitate cross-
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country comparisons.  However, it is important to note that in the presence of growing 
labor force participation rates, the assumption of constant population coverage implies 
declining labor force coverage.  This is particularly relevant for women in MENA 
countries for whom participation in the labor market is increasing rapidly.  In the case of 
insolvent systems, and with reasonable estimates for the discount rate, this assumption 
would overestimate the value of the pay-as-you-go asset.  
Beneficiaries.  Projections of the future number of disabled and survivors are 
done, similarly, by holding constant over time the beneficiary to population ratio in each 
age and gender cohort.  The old age pensioners are modeled in a more complicated way.  
The initial age distribution of the stock of old age pensioners in each pension scheme is 
given (see Figure 3).  For the future, the underlying assumption is that retirement rates,4  
for all ages for which there are retirees today, eventually converge to the current (base 
year) maximum participation rate across plan members of all ages.  For instance, if the 
maximum ratio between the population of contributors, disabled, and retirees and the 
total population is 50 percent (observed say at age 40), then the assumption is that over 
the medium term retirement rates for all ages will converge to 50%.  Basically, if 50% is 
the maximum observed share of individuals of a given age and sex who are in the system 
today, then 50% becomes a ceiling for the share of individuals across ages and gender 
who can be retired when the system matures.     
 
  
Figure 1:  Age Distribution of Current Contributors 
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Source:  Various pension funds 
 
                                                 
4 Here by retirement rates we understand the share of old age pensioners and disabled in the population of a 
given gender at a given age. 
  8
Figure 2:  Current Coverage Rates of the Population of Contributors 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 3:  Age Distribution of Current Old-Age Pensioners 
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Benefit formulas and eligibility conditions.  Key system parameters such as the 
contribution rate, the ceiling on the covered wage, the retirement age and the vesting 
periods, penalties for early retirement, the income measure, the accrual rate, and rules for 
revalorizing wages and indexing pensions are based on the latest legislations.5  
Unfortunately, most countries use ad-hoc or discretionary mechanisms to index pensions 
and revalorize wages.  Hence, in the simulations we follow the approach presented in 
Holzmann et al. (2004) and consider two scenarios:  one in which the growth rate of the 
average covered wage is used to revalorized wages and index pensions, and a second 
where prices are used (the indexation to prices is implicit since all the projections are 
made in real terms).  The revalorization mechanism can have an important impact in the 
level of the IPD in schemes with “long” averaging periods that do not revalorize wages, 
such as the OPS in Djibouti (10 years) and the CNSS in Morocco (8 years).   
Revenues and expenditures in the pension systems.  In the projections, only 
pension related revenues and expenditures are considered in all schemes. Payments under 
social assistance programs and other non-pension expenditures, e.g. health care or 
                                                 
5 Any reforms that are being introduced after the beginning of the simulation period are taken into account 
if they were enacted prior to the base year. 
  9
unemployment benefits, – if they are covered by the pension or social security fund – are 
excluded.  Contributions or transfers to cover these expenditures are also excluded.6    
Any negative pension balance or explicit accumulated debt of the pension system 
at the beginning of the simulation period is ignored – which is the case for CSRO (Iran).  
This assumes that the initial system deficit has been covered by the government’s budget.  
The current reserves of the system are also not taken into account in the projections.  
Basically, for transparency purposes, investment income is ignored.  
Wages.  Actual data on the current average wage of the covered population in 
each of the modeled schemes are used in the simulations.  However, gender differences in 
wages are uniformly ignored even in cases where information about gender distribution 
of wages is available.  In addition, the age profile of wages is normalized across 
countries.  This is important to compare schemes with different income measures, 
particularly when past wages are not revalorized as a function of the growth rate of the 
average covered wage or inflation.  We assume that a one year increase in the age is 
accompanied, on average, by a 1 percentage point increase in wages.  This pattern 
reflects the overall trend observed around the world (see Holzmann et al., 2004).   
Macroeconomy.  To look at the different systems in a comparable economic 
environment, normalized macroeconomic projections are used based on the following 
assumptions:  (i) real GDP growth rate is 4%; (ii) productivity growth is 2%; and (iii) the 
inflation rate is zero (i.e., projections are conducted in real terms).  As IPD estimates are 
highly sensitive to the discount rate used in present value calculations, simulations were 
done with a range of discount rates varying from a low 2% to a relatively high 5%. 
Higher discount rates not only reduce the level of the IPDs for all schemes but in some 
cases they also change their relative position, depending on whether their future unfunded 
liabilities are more front- or back-loaded.  Hence, schemes that have larger expected 
payments further down the road are favored by high discount rates.   
4. Results from the Analysis 
The results of the calculations for the various schemes in the six MENA countries 
are presented in Table 2 .  The first six columns provide estimates of the implicit pension 
debt, while the last six columns present estimates of the pay-as-you-go asset.  Each 
column refers to a combination of the indexation factor for pensions and the discount 
rate. 
A first observation is that in all cases the IPDs are sizable, in general higher for 
the schemes for private sector workers than for the scheme for civil servants (the 
exception is Morocco).  This is not explained by more generosity in the schemes for 
                                                 
6 The following “pension related” contribution rates are assumed: CNR (Djibouti) – 20% (pensioners – 
10.2%); OPS (Djibouti) – 8% (pensioners – 10.9%); CSRO (Iran) – 22.5%; SSO (Iran) – 18%; SSC 
(Jordan) – 16.5%; civil servants and military (Lebanon) – 6%; CMR (Morocco) – 17%; CNSS (Morocco) – 
9.1%; RCAR (Morocco) – 18%; West Bank – 2%; Gaza – 22.5% (however, currently nobody actually pays 
contributions).  The assumed collection rate is based on the actual data on the current status for each 
scheme 
  10
private sector workers, the opposite tends to be true (see Robalino et al. 2005), but simply 
by a larger contributory base.        
Among the four schemes for private sector workers reviewed (Djibouti OPS, Iran 
SSO, Jordan SSC, and Morocco CNSS) the largest IPDs across scenarios are observed in 
Jordan (between 84% and 240% of GDP), followed by Djibouti (67% - 151%), Iran (32% 
- 82%) and Morocco (22%-50%).  Among the schemes for civil servants the highest IPDs 
are observed in the West Bank and Gaza (between 45% and 121% of GDP), followed 
closely by Morocco (between 45% and 111% of GDP) and then Iran (21%  - 52%), 
Djibouti (12% - 23%) and Lebanon (11% - 25%).  In the only military scheme analyzed 
(Lebanon) the IPD ranges between 29% and 78% of GDP.  The lowest IPDs (between 
4% and 11% of GDP) are observed in the scheme for public sector contractual workers in 
Morocco (the RCAR), which is both smaller and better designed than the other schemes 
(see Robalino et al., 2005).   
 
Regarding pay-as-you-go assets an important finding of this paper is that in most 
systems there are none.7  With the exception of the CNR in Djibouti (recently reformed) 
and the RCAR in Morocco, all schemes have large pay-as-you-go liabilities (i.e., the pay-
as-you-go assets are negative).  In Jordan, estimates of pay-as-you-go liabilities for the 
next 75 years range between 2 and 14 times GDP.  With a discount rate of 4% and price 
indexation of pensions, future liabilities could represent 3 times today GDP.  Under the 
same scenario future liabilities in WBG, Iran and Lebanon would represent 3, 2 and 1.7 
times current GDPs respectively.  Only in Morocco and Djibouti would future pay-as-
you-go liabilities be below current GDP (50% and 10% respectively). 
 
Negative pay-as-you-go assets imply that having the pension systems open to new 
entrants (and new contributions) worsens their financial position.  This is because future 
generations will not generate a “surplus” to cover the pensions of current plan members.  
Thus, in the absence of a default, the IPD can only be financed through general revenues.  
It is therefore important to take into account these liabilities when assessing the fiscal 
sustainability of the public debt.     
                                                 
7 It is important to note that the estimates of the pay-as-you-go asset presented in Table 2 overestimate the 
“true” pay-as-you-go asset.  This is because the calculations do not take into account the implicit pension 
liability of the system in year 2075. 
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Table 2:  Implicit Pension Debt and Pay-as-you-go Assets for Pension Scheme in 
MENA Countries 
Country 
Scheme 
IPD  
wage 
IPD  
price 
IPD    
wage 
IPD  
price 
IPD  
wage 
IPD  
price 
PA   
wage 
PA    
price 
PA   
wage 
PA    
price 
PA   
wage 
PA    
price 
  2% 2% 4% 4% 5% 5% 2% 2% 4% 4% 5% 5% 
Djibouti              
CNR 23 19 17 14 14 12 23 36 21 25 18 21 
OPS 151 113 102 79 86 67 -309 -172 -262 -35 -38 -10 
Total 174 132 119 93 100 79 -286 -136 119 -10 -20 11 
Iran             
CSRO 52 38 33 25 27 21 -197 -136 -61 -41 -33 -21 
SSO 82 64 48 39 38 32 -536 -420 -171 -133 -97 -74 
Total 134 102 81 64 65 53 -733 -556 -232 -174 -130 -95 
Jordan             
SSC 240 173 140 105 110 84 -
1402 
-996 -444 -307 -251 -169 
Total 240 173 140 105 110 84 -
1402 
-996 -444 -307 -206 -169 
Lebanon              
CS  25 20 16 13 13 11 -99 -82 -36 -31 -23 -19 
Milit. 1 58 43 41 32 35 29 -205 -176 -91 -80 -65 -56 
Milit. 2  78 57 53 41 45 36 -323 -265 -139 -116 -96 -81 
Total 1 83 63 57 45 48 40 -304 -258 -127 -111 -88 -75 
 Total 2 103 77 69 54 58 47 -422 -347 -175 -147 -119 -100 
Morocco              
CNSS 50 40 32 26 26 22 -154 -117 -47 -34 -26 -18 
CMR 111 84 70 55 57 45 -241 -121 -70 -28 -35 -10 
RCAR 11 7 7 5 6 4 -15 3 0 7 3 7 
Total 172 131 109 86 89 71 -410 -235 -117 -55 -58 -21 
WBG             
WB   68 50 42 32 34 26 -318 -239 -112 -85 -68 -53 
Gaza  53 40 30 24 23 19 -473 -353 -163 -124 -100 -76 
Total 121 90 72 56 57 45 -791 -592 -275 -209 -168 -129 
Note:  The pay-as-you-go asset presented in this table excludes the implicit pension liability of the system 
at the end of the simulation horizon.  Therefore, it overestimates the “true”  pay-as-you-go asset.   
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
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International comparisons show that, despite still favorable demographic 
conditions in most MENA countries, the estimated IPDs are not among the lowest in the 
world (see Table 3).  In fact, only Eastern European countries, which have older 
populations and much higher coverage rates, tend to have larger IPDs than Jordan, 
Djibouti and Morocco.  The IPD for Lebanon is among the lowest in the world, while the 
IPD for Iran and WBG are in the middle of the distribution for non-European countries.     
 
Several factors can explain the international variation of observed IPD/GDP 
ratios, including the generosity of the system, the level of coverage, its demographic 
structure, and the level of wages.  Holzmann et al. (2004) showed that the current level of 
pension expenditures can in fact explain up to 60 percent of the international variation of 
the IPD/GDP ratio.  Adding our countries to the original model changes little the results 
(see Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4:  IPDs and Pension Expenditures at the International Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The doted line refers to the equation estimated in this paper.  The 
continuous line is from Holzmann et al. 2004.   
Source:  Holzmann et al. 2004 and authors’ calculations. 
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50 percent of GDP.  
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Table 3:  International Comparison of IPDs in Selected MENA Countries 
Country 
IPD 
(Wages/2%) 
IPD 
(Prices/2%) 
IPD 
(Wages/4%) 
IPD 
(Prices/4%) 
IPD 
(Wages/5%) 
IPD 
(Prices/5%) 
Brazil 500 362 330 248 275 211 
Macedonia 441 356 291 241 244 204 
Poland 379 304 261 212 220 181 
Ukraine 365 292 257 211 220 183 
Romania 386 292 256 199 214 169 
Uruguay 295 246 214 182 187 160 
Portugal 358 271 233 181 193 151 
Hungary 300 212 203 150 171 128 
Turkey 217 154 146 109 123 93 
Jordan 240 173 140 105 110 84 
Costa Rica 203 163 121 100 97 80 
Djibouti 174 132 119 93 100 79 
Morocco 172 131 109 86 89 71 
Philippines 185 146 107 85 81 66 
Argentina 106 91 85 75 78 70 
Iran 146 110 89 70 72 57 
Bolivia 111 92 73 65 62 55 
Iran 134 102 81 64 65 53 
WBG 121 90 72 56 57 45 
México 101 84 65 54 54 45 
Chile 77 64 60 50 53 45 
Ecuador 103 78 63 49 51 40 
Colombia 88 73 56 48 46 39 
Lebanon 83 63 57 45 48 40 
Mauritius 63 46 47 37 42 33 
Senegal 73 51 51 37 44 32 
Peru 57 51 40 35 34 30 
El Salvador 60 46 43 34 37 29 
Korea 57 35 33 21 26 17 
       
Average 193 149 128 101 107 86 
Countries sorted by the IPD valued at a 4% discount rate using price indexation. 
Source:  For MENA countries authors’ calculations.  For other countries Holzmann et al. 2004. 
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It is informative to compare the IPD with the explicit public debt.  Assuming that 
pensions are indexed by prices and that the discount rate is 4% per year, the estimated 
IPDs in five of the six countries are equal or above the explicit public debt (Table 4 ).  In 
Iran, for instance, the IPD represents 3.2 times the explicit public debt.  Only in Lebanon 
is the IPD relatively low compared to the public debt (25%).  This is because the explicit 
pubic debt is considerably high (over 170% of GDP) but also because there is no pension 
scheme for private sector workers.   
 
To assess the fiscal impact that the implicit pension debt can have we look at the 
fiscal balance necessary to achieve a given reduction of the debt/GDP ratio over a given 
period of time.  Formally, this fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP in each year is given 
by:     
 
( ) ( )( )[ ]( )
( ) ( )1* 11 1111 +−+ −+−−+= nn
nn
r
gxrb θ
θβ ,       (6) 
where β is the debt/GDP ratio, x is the targeted fractional reduction, n is the period of 
time (measured in number of years), r is the interest rate on the debt, g the growth rate of 
GDP, and θ = (1+g)/(1+r).  Clearly, as β and x increase, so does the required fiscal 
balance b*.   
Figure 5 graphs b* as a function of n for three values of β (0.20; 1; and 2) under the 
assumption that x=0.5 (50% reduction), g=0.04, and r=0.05.  We observe that a doubling 
of the debt to GDP ratio also implies a doubling of the fiscal balance necessary to achieve 
a given reduction in this ratio. 
 
Figure 5:  Public Debt and the Fiscal Balance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure is based on equation (6).  The values of the relevant parameters are x=0.5; 
g=0.04; and r=0.05. 
Source:  Authors’  calculations 
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the conservative assumption that pensions are indexed with prices and that the discount 
rate is 4% per year.  The first two columns provide information about the fiscal balance 
necessary to reduce the public debt by 50% over a period of 10 years.  The next two 
columns refer to the case where the 50% reduction is achieved over a period of 20 years, 
while the last two columns consider a period of 30 years.   
 
Table 4:  Fiscal Balance Necessary to Reduce the Public Debt With and 
Without IPD (% GDP) 
 
   
Reduce debt by 
half in 10 years 
Reduce debt by 
half in 20 years 
Reduce debt by 
half in 30 years 
  
Explicit 
Public 
Debt 
Implicit 
Pension 
Debt 
(IPD) 
Explicit 
Public 
Debt 
Only 
With 
IPD 
Explicit 
Public 
Debt 
Only 
With 
IPD 
Explicit 
Public 
Debt 
Only 
With 
IPD 
Djibouti 65% 93% 3.38% 8.22% 2.00% 4.85% 1.51% 3.66% 
Iran 20% 64% 1.04% 4.37% 0.61% 2.58% 0.46% 1.95% 
Jordan 110% 105% 5.72% 11.18% 3.38% 6.60% 2.55% 4.98% 
Lebanon 175% 45% 9.10% 11.44% 5.37% 6.76% 4.06% 5.10% 
Morocco 70% 86% 3.64% 8.11% 2.15% 4.79% 1.62% 3.62% 
Calculations assume that the GDP grows at 4% per year and that the interest on the debt is 4% per year. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
The results of the calculations confirm that current pension liabilities have 
important implications for fiscal policy.  Looking at the case of a 50% reduction over a 
10 year period, the inclusion of the IPD implies increases in the fiscal balances necessary 
to achieve the targets, between 2.34 percentage points in the case of Lebanon to up to 
5.46 percentage points in the case of Jordan.  With a longer period (30 years) the 
increases in the fiscal balances would be less traumatic, but still substantial:   between 1 
percentage point in the case of Lebanon to 2.4 percentage points in the case of Jordan.    
5. Discussion and Policy Implications 
This paper has shown that the contingent liabilities of the government can be 
decomposed into the implicit pension debt (IPD) and the pay-as-you-go asset (PA).  
Estimates for 12 pension schemes across 6 countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
show that IPDs are considerably high (in the order of 50 to over 100 percent of GDP) and 
always above the explicit public debt.  At the same time, the large majority of the 
schemes analyzed have negative pay-as-you-go assets. 
 
The implication is that, in the absence of default, current IPDs can only be 
financed out of current reserves – in general small relative to the IPD – and general 
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revenues.  Governments can continue to “roll-over” the pension debt by “borrowing” new 
contributions, but this will only delay and aggravate the problem.  It follows that 
considering the implicit pension liabilities as contingencies, as opposed to regular debt, 
can severely bias the design of fiscal policy and the assessment of debt sustainability.  
The paper has shown that the fiscal balance targets necessary to reduce debt/GDP ratios 
can change dramatically depending on whether the calculations include or not the IPD.    
 
The natural recommendation is to formally require countries to report the value of 
the IPD and the pay-as-you-go asset as part of the portfolio of public sector obligations 
and to devise appropriate financing mechanisms.  There are, however, questions that will 
need to be addressed before countries start to move in this direction.   
 
One question is what should be the standards to compute and report the IPD, in 
order to ensure comparability across countries?  An initial attempt to develop a standard 
methodology, which has also been applied in this paper, is presented in Holzmann et al. 
(2004), but there are still questions and limitations.  Setting standards, on the other hand, 
is likely to be a continuous process.  Indeed, problems of standardization still pervade 
most components of the national accounts in developing countries.  Thus, reporting 
requirements would not need to wait until the perfect methodology is in place.   
 
A second and, arguably, more fundamental question relates to the effects that 
official reports of the IPD would have on the markets for public debt.  Are current 
investors in government debt already discounting the value of the IPD, or will new 
reporting criteria open a Pandora box?  The evidence from the literature is limited and 
refers largely to occupational plans.  For these plans there is some convincing evidence 
supporting the idea that markets do pay attention to and discount unfunded pension 
liabilities.    Bulow, Mφrck, and Summers (1985) report, for instance, that an increase in 
the implicit pension debt of a company is associated with a fall in the value of its equity.  
These results confirm previous findings by Feldstein and Mφrck (1983) and Feldstein and 
Seligman (1981).   Little is known, however, about the relationship between the spreads 
on government debt and the IPD of the mandatory pension systems. The literature on the 
cross-country determinants of spreads is also limited (see Eichengreen and Mody, 2000 
for a review and recent empirical evidence) and has not looked at the impact of the IPD.  
A recent study uses the institutional investors rating (IIR)8 to investigate countries “debt 
tolerance.” (See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, 2003).  The authors show that 
countries with stories of default and high inflation are penalized by the IIR measure, even 
with relatively low levels of debt.9  The implicit pension debt, however, is not taken into 
account in the analysis.10  To our knowledge, the question of how the IPD of mandatory 
systems influences investors’ attitudes towards government debt remains more or less 
open.   
                                                 
8 The IRR is computed twice a year and is based on information provided by economists and sovereign 
risks analysts at leading global banks and security firms.  The ratings grade each country on a scale from 0 
to 100, with a rating of 100 given to those countries perceived as a having the lowest chance of defaulting 
on their government debt obligations. 
9 The analysis on the paper is actually based on the external debt of the country.    
10 Our own preliminary analysis suggests no correlation between the IPD and the IRR.   
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Three cases could be considered.  In the first case investors would already 
discount the value of the IPDs when pricing the government debt.  In this case, formally 
reporting the IPD -- and even making explicit this IPD through the issuance of bonds -- 
would not affect the spreads of government debt.  In the second case, while taking into 
account the IPD when assessing the risk of default of the government, investors would 
have biased expectations about its level.  In fact, often governments and the pension 
funds themselves are not aware of the value of the IPD.  In this case, revealing new 
information about the IPD and the PA would realign expectations and affect spreads.   
The third case, which can co-exist with the second one, would occur when 
investors do not consider current IPDs an important predictor of the risk of default and do 
not take it into account in the calculations of spreads on government debt.  This could be 
because investors expect that governments will default on the IPD rather than on the 
explicit debt or because they expect that governments will continue to roll-over the IPD 
for still a long time.  Since pension crisis tend to be associated with the aging of the 
population, observations of high young dependency ratios and low old dependency ratios 
would sustain these expectations.  In this case, revealing information about the value of 
the IPD would not affect spreads.  However, making the IPD explicit and adding property 
rights – for instance by issuing bonds – could change expectations about the likelihood of 
default and could affect spreads.   
We argue that even in case two, where current spreads are not reflecting the level 
of the implicit pension debt due to investors myopia, countries would be better off by 
being transparent and reporting the IPD and the pay-as-you-go asset.  This is because 
state two is not stable – investors cannot be fooled forever.  Expectations are constantly 
being updated and investor would eventually learn the true financial position of the 
pension funds.  Governments attempt to hide information would then result in over 
borrowing and eventually a financial crisis when investors finally learn the facts and 
refuse to roll-over public debt.  This situation can be avoided if the government discloses 
the value of the IPD along with a credible plan to finance it – in cases where the pay-as-
you-go asset is negative.  In fact, countries adopting this strategy would be more credible 
than countries that do not.  This is simply because the new information on a given 
country would force investors to also update their expectations about the value of the IPD 
in other countries. 
 
At the same time, rating agencies should give higher scores to countries that 
unveil their pension debt than to countries where an IPD of potential similar magnitude is 
not disclosed.  Finally, international organizations should be more forgiving in terms of 
targeted fiscal balances in countries where efforts are being undertaken to disclose, 
control and finance the accumulation of implicit pension debt.  This could imply lower 
surpluses or higher deficits over the short term, but an overall reduction in the present 
value of the public debt.    
 
As a final comment, we emphasize that Governments can make pension liabilities 
“explicit” in different ways.   Jordan, which recently closed to new entrants the schemes 
for civil servants and the military and assumed the payment of the current and new 
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implicit pension debt of the system, simply “added a line” in the budget.  Basically, the 
value of the IPD was disclosed along with a projection of future expenditures to cover the 
deficits of the two pension funds.   These expenditures are treated as current 
expenditures, similar to wages.  As far as we can tell, there were no visible changes in 
spreads of government debt when the closure of the schemes was announced and the IPD 
disclosed.  If anything, the policy intervention should have been taken with relieve by 
investors who saw the government committing to put a halt to the irresponsible 
accumulation of implicit pension debt.  On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that 
investors’ reactions would have been different if the government had issued recognition 
bonds for individuals’ accrued rights.  There is no strong reason to believe that the 
likelihood of default on government bonds (which give property rights to plan members) 
is higher than the likelihood of default on future pension payments through the general 
budget.   
 
We argue that more transparent and explicit instruments could also be considered 
for new pension liabilities in countries preserving earnings related schemes with pay-as-
you-go financing, if these are made solvent.  In this case, the new IPD, which could take 
the form of government bonds (tradable or not) would be backed by the pay-as-you-go 
asset.  Mechanisms would need to be in place, however, to introduce corrections – ideally 
automatic -- when unexpected shocks start to generate systematic divergences between 
the pay-as-you-go asset and the IPD.    
 
In conclusion, more research is necessary to better understand how investors treat 
the IPD of a country and how they react to changes in its level under different economic 
and demographic environments.  At the same time, efforts to systematically estimate 
IPDs across countries should continue.  This information should be made available to 
policymakers and the general public.  What should be the appropriate reporting 
mechanism is a question still open to debate.  We argue, however, that there could be 
important advantages in terms of increased transparency and better fiscal discipline to 
making, at least the new IPD of reformed earnings related schemes with pay-as-you-go 
financing, fully explicit, by investing new contributions in appropriately indexed 
government bonds.  In this case, tolerance levels for the public debt would need to be 
reviewed, in part by looking at the pay-as-you-go asset.   The fiscal implications of this 
approach are explored in a companion paper.   
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Appendix I:  Dynamics of the Public Debt in Selected MENA Countries 
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Implicit Pension Debt in the Middle East and North Africa:  
Magnitude and Fiscal Implications 
 
David A. Robalino 
 
Tatyana Bogomolova 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper breaks down the contingent liability of a mandatory pension system into two 
components:  the implicit pension debt and the pay-as-you-go asset.  It then estimates 
these two components for 12 pension schemes across six MENA countries and presents 
international comparisons.  The results show that implicit pension debts are large (in the 
order of 50% to 100% of GDP), often higher than the explicit public debt.  At the same 
time, the large majority of pension schemes have negative pay-as-you-go assets.  Under 
these circumstances, it is misleading to consider the implicit pension debt a contingency, 
as the government will have to finance it with almost certainty.  In the absence of a 
default the fiscal impacts are expected to be large.  The paper recommends including in 
the assessment of public debt sustainability the implicit liabilities of the mandatory 
pension system and the pay-as-you-go asset.           
 
ﺺّﺨﻠُﻣ 
 
ﻦﻴﻤﺴﻗ ﻰﻟإ ﺔﻴﻣاﺰﻟﻹا ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا ﺔﻤﻈﻧﻷ ﺔﻠﻤﺘﺤﻤﻟا تﺎﻣاﺰﺘﻟﻻا ﺔﺳارﺪﻟا ﻩﺬه ﻢﺴﻘﺗ : ﻂﻄﺨﻟ ﺔﻴﻨﻤﻀﻟا ﺔﻴﻧﻮﻳﺪﻤﻟا
ﻊﺒﻨﻤﻟا ﺪﻨﻋ ﻂﻴﺴﻘﺘﻟﺎﺑ تﺎﻋﺎﻄﺘﻗﻻا ﻦﻣ لﻮﺻﻷاو ،ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا . نﺄﺸﺑ ﻦﻴﻤﺴﻘﻟا ﻦﻳﺬه تاﺮﻳﺪﻘﺗ ﻊﺿﻮﺑ مﻮﻘﺗ ﻢﺛ12 
ﻣ ناﺪﻠﺑ ﻦﻣ ﺔﺘﺳ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺗ تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻣ ﺔﻄﺧﺎﻧرﺎﻘﻣ ضﺮﻋ ﻊﻣ ،ﺎﻴﻘﻳﺮﻓأ لﺎﻤﺷو ﻂﺳوﻷا قﺮﺸﻟا ﺔﻘﻄﻨتﺔﻴﻟود  . ﻦّﻴﺒُﺗو
 ةﺮﻴﺒآ ﺔﻴﻨﻤﻀﻟا تﺎﻴﻧﻮﻳﺪﻤﻟا نأ ﺞﺋﺎﺘﻨﻟا) ﻦﻴﺑ ﺎﻣ ﻞﺼﺗ ﺔﺒﺴﻨﺑ50 و ﺔﺋﺎﻤﻟا ﻲﻓ 100ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟا ﺞﺗﺎﻨﻟا ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺟإ ﻦﻣ ﺔﺋﺎﻤﻟا ﻲﻓ ( ،
ﺢﻳﺮﺼﻟا مﺎﻌﻟا ﻦْﻳّﺪﻟا راﺪﻘﻣ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺒآأ نﻮﻜﺗ ﺎﻣ ًﺎﺒﻟﺎﻏ ﻲهو .ﺔﻴﺒﻟﺎﻏ نأ ﺪﺠﻧ ،ﻪﺴﻔﻧ ﺖﻗﻮﻟا ﻲﻓو ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا ﻂﻄﺧ 
ﺔﻴﺒﻠﺳ ﻊﺒﻨﻤﻟا ﺪﻨﻋ ﻂﻴﺴﻘﺘﻟﺎﺑ تﺎﻋﺎﻄﺘﻗﻻا ﻦﻣ ﺎﻬﻟﻮﺻأ ُتﻻﺪﻌﻣ . رﺎﺒﺘﻋا ﻞّﻠﻀُﻤﻟا ﻦﻣ نﻮﻜﻳ ،عﺎﺿوﻷا ﻩﺬه ّﻞﻇ ﻲﻓو
 تﺎﻣﻮﻜﺤﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ ًﺎﺒﻳﺮﻘﺗ ﺪﻴآﺄﺘﻟﺎﺑ ﻲﻐﺒﻨﻳ ﻪﻧﻷ ﺔﺋرﺎﻄﻟا تﻻﺎﻤﺘﺣﻻا ﻦﻣ ًﺎﻋﻮﻧ ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا ﻂﻄﺨﻟ ﺔﻴﻨﻤﻀﻟا ﺔﻴﻧﻮﻳﺪﻤﻟا
ﺔﻴﻧﻮﻳﺪﻤﻟا ﻚﻠﺗ ﻞﻳﻮﻤﺗ.ًاﺮﻴﺒآ ﺔﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ ﺮﺛﻷا نﻮﻜﻳ نأ ﻊّﻗﻮﺘﻤﻟا ﻦﻣ نﺈﻓ ،داﺪﺴﻟا ﻦﻋ ﺰﺠﻌﻟا ﻞﺼﺤﻳ ﻢﻟ اذإو  .
 ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا ﺔﻤﻈﻧﻷ ﺔﻠﻤﺘﺤﻤﻟا تﺎﻣاﺰﺘﻟﻻا مﺎﻌﻟا ﻦْﻳّﺪﻟا ﻞّﻤﺤﺗ ﻰﻠﻋ ةرﺪﻘﻟا تاﺮﻳﺪﻘﺗ ﻦﻴﻤﻀﺘﺑ ﺔﺳارﺪﻟا ﻩﺬه ﻲﺻﻮﺗو
ﻊﺒﻨﻤﻟا ﺪﻨﻋ ﻂﻴﺴﻘﺘﻟﺎﺑ تﺎﻋﺎﻄﺘﻗﻻا ﻦﻣ لﻮﺻﻸﻟو ﺔﻴﻣاﺰﻟﻹا      .   
 
RÉSUMÉ 
 
Le document présente une ventilation du passif éventuel d’un régime de retraite 
obligatoire selon deux composantes : l’endettement implicite du régime de retraite et les 
actifs du régime fondé sur la répartition (« pay-as-you-go »).  Il estime ensuite ces deux 
  ii
composantes pour 12 régimes de retraite de six pays de la région MENA et présente des 
comparaisons internationales.  Les résultats indiquent que l’endettement implicite des 
régimes de retraite est important (de l’ordre de 50 pour cent à 100 pour cent du PIB), et 
qu’il est souvent supérieur à l’endettement public explicite.  Parallèlement, la vaste 
majorité des régimes de retraite font montre d’actifs négatifs pour le régime fondé sur la 
répartition.  Dans ces circonstances, il est erroné de considérer l’endettement implicite 
des régimes de retraite comme un passif, étant pratiquement certain que le gouvernement 
devra le financer.  En l’absence de défaut, les impacts budgétaires sont anticipés 
importants.  Le document recommande d’inclure dans l’évaluation de la viabilité de la 
dette publique, les passifs implicites du régime de retraite obligatoire et les actifs du 
régime fondé sur la répartition.           
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1. Introduction 
The proper measurement and monitoring of the public debt and the total external 
debt of a country are essential for the efficient design of fiscal policy and the prevention 
of financial crisis.  There is an ongoing debate in terms of the most appropriate 
methodology to measure the level of these debts and assess their sustainability (see IMF, 
2004 for a discussion in the case of low-income countries, and a more general discussion 
on debt tolerance by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003).  In all cases, however, the 
implicit liabilities of the mandatory pension funds are excluded from the analysis.  At 
best, the implicit pension debt is treated as a contingent liability of the government and is 
not reported as part of the public debt.  Unfortunately, it can be shown that when the 
pension system is not solvent, a large component of the implicit pension debt is actually 
not “contingent.”  The probability that the government will have to repay – or default on 
this debt – is very close to one.  Excluding this non-contingent component from the 
assessment of public debt sustainability can therefore seriously bias the design and 
implementation of fiscal policy. 
The objectives of this paper are to describe the true nature of the contingent 
liability of the pension systems in selected MENA countries and asses its fiscal 
implications.  We start by breaking down the contingent pension liability into two 
components:  the implicit pension debt (IPD) and the so called pay-as-you-go asset (PA).  
We then estimate the value of these two components for 12 schemes across 6 MENA 
countries1 and benchmark the results against those observed in other countries.2  To 
assess potential fiscal implications, we compute the change in the fiscal balance 
necessary to reduce the debt/GDP ratio by a given fraction over some period of time, 
resulting from the inclusion of the IPD in the debt sustainability analysis. 
The core of the paper is organized in 4 sections.  Section 2 sets the analytical 
framework by presenting the traditional definition of public debt and characterizing the 
contingent liability of the mandatory pension system.  Section 3 describes the methods 
and the data used to estimate IPDs and pay-as-you-go assets.  Section 4 presents the 
results of the analysis and assesses fiscal impacts.  Section 5 concludes and 
discusses policy implications. 
2. Public Debt and Contingent Pension Liabilities 
The public debt, as defined in Government Financial Statistics of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), incorporates public and publicly guaranteed obligations of the 
central, municipal, and local governments -- as well as other public entities -- with non-
government institutions.  Although not included directly in the calculation of the public 
debt, the definition recognizes the existence of contingent liabilities of various public 
institutions (e.g., state owned enterprises, banks) as well as the pension funds.   In this 
                                                 
1 Countries have been selected on the basis of available information. 
2 The calculation of the IPD is based on the methodology developed in Holzmann et al. (2004), which 
normalizes assumptions to make results comparable across countries.   
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section we show why treating the implicit debt of the pension funds as a contingency can 
be misleading. 
In an earnings related pension system that is not fully funded, current promises to 
pay pensions (pension rights accrued to date) are backed by available reserves as well as 
future contributions net of future pension payments ensuing from these contributions – 
the so called pay-as-you-go asset.  The contingent liability of the pension funds, on the 
other hand, is often interpreted as the part of future obligations that, with some 
probability, cannot be covered by future revenues.    Formally, the contingent liability can 
be defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] tpct RALLECPL −−+= θθθ ;;; sw,,N,Nsp,,Nsw,,N ncpc ,   (1)   
where E is the expectations operator, Lc(.) gives the liabilities of the pension system with 
current contributors (Nc), which depend on current and future average wages by age (w), 
a vector of current and future survival probabilities by age (s), and the parameters of the 
system (θ); Lp gives the liabilities with current beneficiaries (Np), which depend  on the 
current distribution of pensions (p), survival probabilities, and system parameters (e.g., 
pension indexation mechanisms); and A(.) is the pay-as-you-go asset, which depends on 
current and new contributors  (Nn), as well as wages, survival probabilities, and system 
parameters; and  Rt represents current reserves.   The implicit pension liability (IPD) of 
the system, the accrued to date liability, is given by Lc(.) + Lp(.).   
In a solvent pension system one would expect the contingent liability to be equal 
to or less than zero.  In other words, the expected implicit pension liability net of reserves 
would be at least equal to the expected pay-as-you-go asset.  Any deviation from 
equilibrium would not be systematic, but rather the result of unexpected shocks.  Under 
some designs, automatic rules that adjust θ to changes in the demographic and economic 
environment could even eliminate the contingent pension liability.  In this case, the IPD 
net of reserves would be equal to the pay-as-you-go asset in all states of nature. 
When the pension system is insolvent, however, the expected contingent liability 
is positive.  That is, under average conditions, the IPD net of reserves would be above the 
pay-as-you-go asset.  At the extreme, it is possible to observe an expected pay-as-you-go 
asset which is negative.  Indeed, it can be shown that the pay-as-you-go asset is equal to 
the accrued to date pension liabilities (IPD) plus the present value of future cash-balances 
(which is the negative of the so called financing gap, FG, of the system).  Formally, over 
the infinite horizon, we have: 
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where c are contributions at time t, pe are pension payments accrued by the new 
contributions of current plan members; pn are pension payments accrued by the 
contributions of new entrants to the system, pp are pension payments to current 
beneficiaries, and pc are pension payments to current contributors for the pension rights 
that they have accrued to date. Hence, if the financing gap of the system is large enough 
(higher than the IPD), the pay-as-you-go asset of the pension system becomes negative.  
Basically, future contributions do not generate a surplus in present value that can be used 
to finance the IPD. On the contrary, the new contributions bring new liabilities that 
themselves cannot be financed by the system.  In other words, keeping the system open to 
new contributions worsens its long-term financial position.       
 
Having a negative pay-as-you-go asset has important fiscal implications because 
it implies that only general revenues can be used to finance the IPD.3  Governments can 
delay the use of general revenues by continuing to “borrow” contributions to pay 
pensions, but because these new contributions also bring new pension liabilities, the 
situation eventually becomes explosive.  Under these circumstances, the liabilities of the 
pension funds do not represent a contingency for the government but rather a real debt 
that, in the absence of default, sooner or later will need to be financed.  When this is the 
case, excluding the IPD from the analysis of fiscal sustainability of the public debt can 
lead to severely biased policy recommendations.   
The next two sections of this paper are concerned with the estimation of the IPD 
and the pay-as-you-go asset of pension systems in various MENA countries.   
3.  Methods and Data  
The implicit pension debt is defined here as the accrued-to-date liabilities, or the 
PBO (projected benefit obligation).  It is equal to the present value of the benefits the 
pension system will have to pay to its current participants (and their survivors) on the 
basis of their pension rights accrued prior to the year for which the IPD is calculated.  
The calculation of benefits is made on the basis of future wages (i.e., wages at the time of 
retirement).  Neither future contributions nor new pension rights are included in the 
calculation.   Thus, the IPD shows how much it would cost to discontinue the pension 
scheme and pay out all obligations (see Holzmann et al., 2004 for a review of various 
measures of pension liabilities). 
                                                 
3 Here we abstract from the existence of reserves.  As shown later these are usually very low relative to the 
level of the IPD. 
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Our estimates of the IPD are based on the World Bank PROST (Pension Reform 
Options Simulation Toolkit) model.  Given limited information in most middle and low-
income countries about the vesting period of current contributors and their turnover rates, 
when computing pension payments for new retirees PROST uses little information about 
“their past.”  Thus, it is not possible to differentiate between those future new retirees 
who are contributors today and those future new retirees who enrolled in the system at a 
latter date.  Similarly, in the case of future new retirees who are contributors today, it is 
not possible to distinguish between the part of the pension that is associated with rights 
accumulated to date, and pension rights accumulated through new contributions.  In 
essence, for all new retirees of age a at time t, PROST computes the pension on the basis 
of an estimate of the average length of service at retirement.  However, because the 
pension payments in year t are related to both pension rights accrued to the date of 
computing the IPD and pension rights resulting from new contributions (of current and 
new plan members), a mechanism is necessary to separate the two.  For simplicity, 
PROST increases the share of pension rights accrued from new contributions in direct 
proportion to time.  As an illustration, assume that the calculation of the IPD is made at 
time t=0, that the average retirement age is 55, and that the youngest age at which 
individuals join the system is 20.  PROST in this case infers that the pension payments to 
new retirees in year t=1 are all the result of contributions made during the last 35 (55-20) 
years (i.e., are related to the pension rights accrued to date by current contributors).  As t 
increases, however, the role of past years of contributions has to diminish.  Hence, for 
year t=2, PROST reduces the share of past years by 1/35 -- since pension payments to 
new retirees now can reflect on year of new contributions.  Similarly, in year t=3 the 
share of past years of contributions is reduced by 2/35 and by 3/35 in year t=4.  At some 
point in time, past years of contributions are no longer associated with the pension 
payments to new retirees, as these result entirely from pension rights accrued through 
new contributions.   
 
Formally, the accrued to date liability with current contributors is given by: 
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where NPy,g is the number of new retirees of sex g in year y, RA_NPt,g is the average 
retirement age of all new retirees of sex g in year t, EA is the age of the youngest 
contributor, ρ is the discount rate, and PV_NPy,g is the average present value at time y of 
the stream of pension payments made to new retirees of sex g between times y and T.  
For each of these new retirees the present value of the future pension payments is itself 
given by: 
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where a indexes the age of the individual, i indexes the income category, NB is the first 
pension payment to the new retiree, B represents the indexed pension at time y, and ma 
the mortality rate at age a.  A similar approach is used to allocate disability pensions. 
 
The method described above for the calculation of the implicit pension debt with 
current contributors has proven to provide a reasonable approximation of the “true” IPD 
in the case systems that have been in operation for over 20 to 30 years.  Thus, it is 
suitable for all pension schemes analyzed in this paper.  For younger systems, or systems 
that start from scratch, the methodology just described tends to overestimate the IPD, as 
too much weight is given the accrued rights of current contributors. 
 
The liabilities to current beneficiaries comprise liabilities to old age pensioners, 
disabled, survivors and orphans.  The IPD to current old age pensioners is calculated in a 
more precise way than to current contributors, by following the current age-sex cohorts of 
beneficiaries over time.  Formally, the IPD is defined by: 
 
∑ ⋅=
gia
gtiagtiat OAPOAPPVOAPIPD
,,
,,,,,,__ ,       (5)    
 
where PV_OAPa,i,t,g is the present value of the stream of pension payments to a pensioner 
of age a and sex g, in income category i (see equation 4); and OAPa,i,t,g is the number of 
these individuals.  A similar approach is used to compute the implicit liabilities of current 
disabled.  Obligations to survivors (widows/widowers and orphans) are estimated with a 
lesser precision. PROST assumes that the share of obligations to survivors in the total 
IPD to existing old age pensioners and disabled is the same as the share of survivor 
pension expenditures on total expenditures.    
Data and Assumptions 
We estimate the implicit pension debt and the pay-as-you-go asset for 12 pension 
systems across 6 countries in the region.  These countries have been selected on the basis 
of data availability.  In the context of a cross country analysis, it is essential to find the 
right balance between taking into account the idiosyncrasy of a country’s pension system, 
on the one hand, and the comparability of the results, on the other.  To this end, we 
follow the methodology and assumptions developed by Holzmann et al. (2004), which 
allows for international comparisons.  Below we describe the key data and assumptions 
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regarding demographic dynamics, coverage, retirement patterns, benefit formulas, the 
finances of the system, and the macroeconomy.   
Demography.  Population projections are important to compute the pay-as-you-go 
asset because they determine the number of scheme participants by sex and age.   The 
projections are based on information provided by the World Bank’s Population Unit 
regarding the initial population by age and gender, and projections of age-specific 
fertility and mortality rates for each country. In line with international trends, mortality 
rates are assumed to decrease over time resulting in growing life expectancy, while 
fertility rates gradually converge to reproduction level (see Table 1). Decreasing 
mortality and fertility rates result in population aging and growing system dependency 
rates. 
To follow the different cohorts of contributors and beneficiaries over time, 
nationwide mortality rates are applied to the members of all schemes.  This is because of 
the lack of mortality rates which are specific to plan members.  The use of nationwide 
mortality rates adds some bias to the projections as coverage rates are relatively low and 
those who participate in the system are generally middle and high income individuals 
(particularly in the case of civil servants) who are expected to have longer life 
expectancies.  This would underestimate the implicit pension debt. 
Contributors.  The initial number of contributors and beneficiaries and their 
distribution by age and sex are based on actual data provided by the respective pension 
funds.  The initial age distributions of contributors for all considered schemes are 
compared on Figure 1.  Private sector schemes are shown on the left-hand side chart, 
public sector schemes on the right-hand side.  In general, schemes for civil servants have 
a more mature population because often they were created first.     
 
Table 1:  Expected Dynamics of Life Expectancy and Fertility Rates 
 Base Year 2020 2040 2060 2075 
Life Expectancy at Birth      
Djibouti 42.5 49.8 59.3 67.6 71.7 
Iran 69.5 74.5 77.5 81.7 84.5 
Jordan 71.3 75.3 77.4 79.9 81.5 
Lebanon 70.3 74.0 76.8 79.9 82.8 
Morocco 68.1 71.9 74.5 77.3 79.6 
West Bank&Gaza 72.3 75.4 77.3 79.3 80.8 
Total Fertility Rates      
Djibouti 493% 314% 241% 221% 213% 
Iran 250% 211% 210% 208% 207% 
Jordan 350% 209% 208% 207% 207% 
Lebanon 225% 210% 209% 208% 207% 
Morocco 273% 213% 210% 209% 207% 
West Bank&Gaza 485% 309% 214% 210% 206% 
Source:  WB Population Unit. 
To project the stock of future contributors by age and sex it is assumed, for all 
schemes and all countries, that current population coverage rates by age and gender 
remain constant (see Figure 2).  This normalization is introduced to facilitate cross-
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country comparisons.  However, it is important to note that in the presence of growing 
labor force participation rates, the assumption of constant population coverage implies 
declining labor force coverage.  This is particularly relevant for women in MENA 
countries for whom participation in the labor market is increasing rapidly.  In the case of 
insolvent systems, and with reasonable estimates for the discount rate, this assumption 
would overestimate the value of the pay-as-you-go asset.  
Beneficiaries.  Projections of the future number of disabled and survivors are 
done, similarly, by holding constant over time the beneficiary to population ratio in each 
age and gender cohort.  The old age pensioners are modeled in a more complicated way.  
The initial age distribution of the stock of old age pensioners in each pension scheme is 
given (see Figure 3).  For the future, the underlying assumption is that retirement rates,4  
for all ages for which there are retirees today, eventually converge to the current (base 
year) maximum participation rate across plan members of all ages.  For instance, if the 
maximum ratio between the population of contributors, disabled, and retirees and the 
total population is 50 percent (observed say at age 40), then the assumption is that over 
the medium term retirement rates for all ages will converge to 50%.  Basically, if 50% is 
the maximum observed share of individuals of a given age and sex who are in the system 
today, then 50% becomes a ceiling for the share of individuals across ages and gender 
who can be retired when the system matures.     
 
  
Figure 1:  Age Distribution of Current Contributors 
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Source:  Various pension funds 
 
                                                 
4 Here by retirement rates we understand the share of old age pensioners and disabled in the population of a 
given gender at a given age. 
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Figure 2:  Current Coverage Rates of the Population of Contributors 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 3:  Age Distribution of Current Old-Age Pensioners 
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Benefit formulas and eligibility conditions.  Key system parameters such as the 
contribution rate, the ceiling on the covered wage, the retirement age and the vesting 
periods, penalties for early retirement, the income measure, the accrual rate, and rules for 
revalorizing wages and indexing pensions are based on the latest legislations.5  
Unfortunately, most countries use ad-hoc or discretionary mechanisms to index pensions 
and revalorize wages.  Hence, in the simulations we follow the approach presented in 
Holzmann et al. (2004) and consider two scenarios:  one in which the growth rate of the 
average covered wage is used to revalorized wages and index pensions, and a second 
where prices are used (the indexation to prices is implicit since all the projections are 
made in real terms).  The revalorization mechanism can have an important impact in the 
level of the IPD in schemes with “long” averaging periods that do not revalorize wages, 
such as the OPS in Djibouti (10 years) and the CNSS in Morocco (8 years).   
Revenues and expenditures in the pension systems.  In the projections, only 
pension related revenues and expenditures are considered in all schemes. Payments under 
social assistance programs and other non-pension expenditures, e.g. health care or 
                                                 
5 Any reforms that are being introduced after the beginning of the simulation period are taken into account 
if they were enacted prior to the base year. 
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unemployment benefits, – if they are covered by the pension or social security fund – are 
excluded.  Contributions or transfers to cover these expenditures are also excluded.6    
Any negative pension balance or explicit accumulated debt of the pension system 
at the beginning of the simulation period is ignored – which is the case for CSRO (Iran).  
This assumes that the initial system deficit has been covered by the government’s budget.  
The current reserves of the system are also not taken into account in the projections.  
Basically, for transparency purposes, investment income is ignored.  
Wages.  Actual data on the current average wage of the covered population in 
each of the modeled schemes are used in the simulations.  However, gender differences in 
wages are uniformly ignored even in cases where information about gender distribution 
of wages is available.  In addition, the age profile of wages is normalized across 
countries.  This is important to compare schemes with different income measures, 
particularly when past wages are not revalorized as a function of the growth rate of the 
average covered wage or inflation.  We assume that a one year increase in the age is 
accompanied, on average, by a 1 percentage point increase in wages.  This pattern 
reflects the overall trend observed around the world (see Holzmann et al., 2004).   
Macroeconomy.  To look at the different systems in a comparable economic 
environment, normalized macroeconomic projections are used based on the following 
assumptions:  (i) real GDP growth rate is 4%; (ii) productivity growth is 2%; and (iii) the 
inflation rate is zero (i.e., projections are conducted in real terms).  As IPD estimates are 
highly sensitive to the discount rate used in present value calculations, simulations were 
done with a range of discount rates varying from a low 2% to a relatively high 5%. 
Higher discount rates not only reduce the level of the IPDs for all schemes but in some 
cases they also change their relative position, depending on whether their future unfunded 
liabilities are more front- or back-loaded.  Hence, schemes that have larger expected 
payments further down the road are favored by high discount rates.   
4. Results from the Analysis 
The results of the calculations for the various schemes in the six MENA countries 
are presented in Table 2 .  The first six columns provide estimates of the implicit pension 
debt, while the last six columns present estimates of the pay-as-you-go asset.  Each 
column refers to a combination of the indexation factor for pensions and the discount 
rate. 
A first observation is that in all cases the IPDs are sizable, in general higher for 
the schemes for private sector workers than for the scheme for civil servants (the 
exception is Morocco).  This is not explained by more generosity in the schemes for 
                                                 
6 The following “pension related” contribution rates are assumed: CNR (Djibouti) – 20% (pensioners – 
10.2%); OPS (Djibouti) – 8% (pensioners – 10.9%); CSRO (Iran) – 22.5%; SSO (Iran) – 18%; SSC 
(Jordan) – 16.5%; civil servants and military (Lebanon) – 6%; CMR (Morocco) – 17%; CNSS (Morocco) – 
9.1%; RCAR (Morocco) – 18%; West Bank – 2%; Gaza – 22.5% (however, currently nobody actually pays 
contributions).  The assumed collection rate is based on the actual data on the current status for each 
scheme 
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private sector workers, the opposite tends to be true (see Robalino et al. 2005), but simply 
by a larger contributory base.        
Among the four schemes for private sector workers reviewed (Djibouti OPS, Iran 
SSO, Jordan SSC, and Morocco CNSS) the largest IPDs across scenarios are observed in 
Jordan (between 84% and 240% of GDP), followed by Djibouti (67% - 151%), Iran (32% 
- 82%) and Morocco (22%-50%).  Among the schemes for civil servants the highest IPDs 
are observed in the West Bank and Gaza (between 45% and 121% of GDP), followed 
closely by Morocco (between 45% and 111% of GDP) and then Iran (21%  - 52%), 
Djibouti (12% - 23%) and Lebanon (11% - 25%).  In the only military scheme analyzed 
(Lebanon) the IPD ranges between 29% and 78% of GDP.  The lowest IPDs (between 
4% and 11% of GDP) are observed in the scheme for public sector contractual workers in 
Morocco (the RCAR), which is both smaller and better designed than the other schemes 
(see Robalino et al., 2005).   
 
Regarding pay-as-you-go assets an important finding of this paper is that in most 
systems there are none.7  With the exception of the CNR in Djibouti (recently reformed) 
and the RCAR in Morocco, all schemes have large pay-as-you-go liabilities (i.e., the pay-
as-you-go assets are negative).  In Jordan, estimates of pay-as-you-go liabilities for the 
next 75 years range between 2 and 14 times GDP.  With a discount rate of 4% and price 
indexation of pensions, future liabilities could represent 3 times today GDP.  Under the 
same scenario future liabilities in WBG, Iran and Lebanon would represent 3, 2 and 1.7 
times current GDPs respectively.  Only in Morocco and Djibouti would future pay-as-
you-go liabilities be below current GDP (50% and 10% respectively). 
 
Negative pay-as-you-go assets imply that having the pension systems open to new 
entrants (and new contributions) worsens their financial position.  This is because future 
generations will not generate a “surplus” to cover the pensions of current plan members.  
Thus, in the absence of a default, the IPD can only be financed through general revenues.  
It is therefore important to take into account these liabilities when assessing the fiscal 
sustainability of the public debt.     
                                                 
7 It is important to note that the estimates of the pay-as-you-go asset presented in Table 2 overestimate the 
“true” pay-as-you-go asset.  This is because the calculations do not take into account the implicit pension 
liability of the system in year 2075. 
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Table 2:  Implicit Pension Debt and Pay-as-you-go Assets for Pension Scheme in 
MENA Countries 
Country 
Scheme 
IPD  
wage 
IPD  
price 
IPD    
wage 
IPD  
price 
IPD  
wage 
IPD  
price 
PA   
wage 
PA    
price 
PA   
wage 
PA    
price 
PA   
wage 
PA    
price 
  2% 2% 4% 4% 5% 5% 2% 2% 4% 4% 5% 5% 
Djibouti              
CNR 23 19 17 14 14 12 23 36 21 25 18 21 
OPS 151 113 102 79 86 67 -309 -172 -262 -35 -38 -10 
Total 174 132 119 93 100 79 -286 -136 119 -10 -20 11 
Iran             
CSRO 52 38 33 25 27 21 -197 -136 -61 -41 -33 -21 
SSO 82 64 48 39 38 32 -536 -420 -171 -133 -97 -74 
Total 134 102 81 64 65 53 -733 -556 -232 -174 -130 -95 
Jordan             
SSC 240 173 140 105 110 84 -
1402 
-996 -444 -307 -251 -169 
Total 240 173 140 105 110 84 -
1402 
-996 -444 -307 -206 -169 
Lebanon              
CS  25 20 16 13 13 11 -99 -82 -36 -31 -23 -19 
Milit. 1 58 43 41 32 35 29 -205 -176 -91 -80 -65 -56 
Milit. 2  78 57 53 41 45 36 -323 -265 -139 -116 -96 -81 
Total 1 83 63 57 45 48 40 -304 -258 -127 -111 -88 -75 
 Total 2 103 77 69 54 58 47 -422 -347 -175 -147 -119 -100 
Morocco              
CNSS 50 40 32 26 26 22 -154 -117 -47 -34 -26 -18 
CMR 111 84 70 55 57 45 -241 -121 -70 -28 -35 -10 
RCAR 11 7 7 5 6 4 -15 3 0 7 3 7 
Total 172 131 109 86 89 71 -410 -235 -117 -55 -58 -21 
WBG             
WB   68 50 42 32 34 26 -318 -239 -112 -85 -68 -53 
Gaza  53 40 30 24 23 19 -473 -353 -163 -124 -100 -76 
Total 121 90 72 56 57 45 -791 -592 -275 -209 -168 -129 
Note:  The pay-as-you-go asset presented in this table excludes the implicit pension liability of the system 
at the end of the simulation horizon.  Therefore, it overestimates the “true”  pay-as-you-go asset.   
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
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International comparisons show that, despite still favorable demographic 
conditions in most MENA countries, the estimated IPDs are not among the lowest in the 
world (see Table 3).  In fact, only Eastern European countries, which have older 
populations and much higher coverage rates, tend to have larger IPDs than Jordan, 
Djibouti and Morocco.  The IPD for Lebanon is among the lowest in the world, while the 
IPD for Iran and WBG are in the middle of the distribution for non-European countries.     
 
Several factors can explain the international variation of observed IPD/GDP 
ratios, including the generosity of the system, the level of coverage, its demographic 
structure, and the level of wages.  Holzmann et al. (2004) showed that the current level of 
pension expenditures can in fact explain up to 60 percent of the international variation of 
the IPD/GDP ratio.  Adding our countries to the original model changes little the results 
(see Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4:  IPDs and Pension Expenditures at the International Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The doted line refers to the equation estimated in this paper.  The 
continuous line is from Holzmann et al. 2004.   
Source:  Holzmann et al. 2004 and authors’ calculations. 
 
When this simple model is applied to Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, 
for which no data are currently available to directly estimate the IPD, we obtain estimates 
of 109%, 108%, 91%, 129% and 67% of GDP respectively.  Clearly, these estimates 
incorporate a large error, but one can be confident that IPDs in these countries are above 
50 percent of GDP.  
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Table 3:  International Comparison of IPDs in Selected MENA Countries 
Country 
IPD 
(Wages/2%) 
IPD 
(Prices/2%) 
IPD 
(Wages/4%) 
IPD 
(Prices/4%) 
IPD 
(Wages/5%) 
IPD 
(Prices/5%) 
Brazil 500 362 330 248 275 211 
Macedonia 441 356 291 241 244 204 
Poland 379 304 261 212 220 181 
Ukraine 365 292 257 211 220 183 
Romania 386 292 256 199 214 169 
Uruguay 295 246 214 182 187 160 
Portugal 358 271 233 181 193 151 
Hungary 300 212 203 150 171 128 
Turkey 217 154 146 109 123 93 
Jordan 240 173 140 105 110 84 
Costa Rica 203 163 121 100 97 80 
Djibouti 174 132 119 93 100 79 
Morocco 172 131 109 86 89 71 
Philippines 185 146 107 85 81 66 
Argentina 106 91 85 75 78 70 
Iran 146 110 89 70 72 57 
Bolivia 111 92 73 65 62 55 
Iran 134 102 81 64 65 53 
WBG 121 90 72 56 57 45 
México 101 84 65 54 54 45 
Chile 77 64 60 50 53 45 
Ecuador 103 78 63 49 51 40 
Colombia 88 73 56 48 46 39 
Lebanon 83 63 57 45 48 40 
Mauritius 63 46 47 37 42 33 
Senegal 73 51 51 37 44 32 
Peru 57 51 40 35 34 30 
El Salvador 60 46 43 34 37 29 
Korea 57 35 33 21 26 17 
       
Average 193 149 128 101 107 86 
Countries sorted by the IPD valued at a 4% discount rate using price indexation. 
Source:  For MENA countries authors’ calculations.  For other countries Holzmann et al. 2004. 
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It is informative to compare the IPD with the explicit public debt.  Assuming that 
pensions are indexed by prices and that the discount rate is 4% per year, the estimated 
IPDs in five of the six countries are equal or above the explicit public debt (Table 4 ).  In 
Iran, for instance, the IPD represents 3.2 times the explicit public debt.  Only in Lebanon 
is the IPD relatively low compared to the public debt (25%).  This is because the explicit 
pubic debt is considerably high (over 170% of GDP) but also because there is no pension 
scheme for private sector workers.   
 
To assess the fiscal impact that the implicit pension debt can have we look at the 
fiscal balance necessary to achieve a given reduction of the debt/GDP ratio over a given 
period of time.  Formally, this fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP in each year is given 
by:     
 
( ) ( )( )[ ]( )
( ) ( )1* 11 1111 +−+ −+−−+= nn
nn
r
gxrb θ
θβ ,       (6) 
where β is the debt/GDP ratio, x is the targeted fractional reduction, n is the period of 
time (measured in number of years), r is the interest rate on the debt, g the growth rate of 
GDP, and θ = (1+g)/(1+r).  Clearly, as β and x increase, so does the required fiscal 
balance b*.   
Figure 5 graphs b* as a function of n for three values of β (0.20; 1; and 2) under the 
assumption that x=0.5 (50% reduction), g=0.04, and r=0.05.  We observe that a doubling 
of the debt to GDP ratio also implies a doubling of the fiscal balance necessary to achieve 
a given reduction in this ratio. 
 
Figure 5:  Public Debt and the Fiscal Balance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure is based on equation (6).  The values of the relevant parameters are x=0.5; 
g=0.04; and r=0.05. 
Source:  Authors’  calculations 
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the conservative assumption that pensions are indexed with prices and that the discount 
rate is 4% per year.  The first two columns provide information about the fiscal balance 
necessary to reduce the public debt by 50% over a period of 10 years.  The next two 
columns refer to the case where the 50% reduction is achieved over a period of 20 years, 
while the last two columns consider a period of 30 years.   
 
Table 4:  Fiscal Balance Necessary to Reduce the Public Debt With and 
Without IPD (% GDP) 
 
   
Reduce debt by 
half in 10 years 
Reduce debt by 
half in 20 years 
Reduce debt by 
half in 30 years 
  
Explicit 
Public 
Debt 
Implicit 
Pension 
Debt 
(IPD) 
Explicit 
Public 
Debt 
Only 
With 
IPD 
Explicit 
Public 
Debt 
Only 
With 
IPD 
Explicit 
Public 
Debt 
Only 
With 
IPD 
Djibouti 65% 93% 3.38% 8.22% 2.00% 4.85% 1.51% 3.66% 
Iran 20% 64% 1.04% 4.37% 0.61% 2.58% 0.46% 1.95% 
Jordan 110% 105% 5.72% 11.18% 3.38% 6.60% 2.55% 4.98% 
Lebanon 175% 45% 9.10% 11.44% 5.37% 6.76% 4.06% 5.10% 
Morocco 70% 86% 3.64% 8.11% 2.15% 4.79% 1.62% 3.62% 
Calculations assume that the GDP grows at 4% per year and that the interest on the debt is 4% per year. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
The results of the calculations confirm that current pension liabilities have 
important implications for fiscal policy.  Looking at the case of a 50% reduction over a 
10 year period, the inclusion of the IPD implies increases in the fiscal balances necessary 
to achieve the targets, between 2.34 percentage points in the case of Lebanon to up to 
5.46 percentage points in the case of Jordan.  With a longer period (30 years) the 
increases in the fiscal balances would be less traumatic, but still substantial:   between 1 
percentage point in the case of Lebanon to 2.4 percentage points in the case of Jordan.    
5. Discussion and Policy Implications 
This paper has shown that the contingent liabilities of the government can be 
decomposed into the implicit pension debt (IPD) and the pay-as-you-go asset (PA).  
Estimates for 12 pension schemes across 6 countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
show that IPDs are considerably high (in the order of 50 to over 100 percent of GDP) and 
always above the explicit public debt.  At the same time, the large majority of the 
schemes analyzed have negative pay-as-you-go assets. 
 
The implication is that, in the absence of default, current IPDs can only be 
financed out of current reserves – in general small relative to the IPD – and general 
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revenues.  Governments can continue to “roll-over” the pension debt by “borrowing” new 
contributions, but this will only delay and aggravate the problem.  It follows that 
considering the implicit pension liabilities as contingencies, as opposed to regular debt, 
can severely bias the design of fiscal policy and the assessment of debt sustainability.  
The paper has shown that the fiscal balance targets necessary to reduce debt/GDP ratios 
can change dramatically depending on whether the calculations include or not the IPD.    
 
The natural recommendation is to formally require countries to report the value of 
the IPD and the pay-as-you-go asset as part of the portfolio of public sector obligations 
and to devise appropriate financing mechanisms.  There are, however, questions that will 
need to be addressed before countries start to move in this direction.   
 
One question is what should be the standards to compute and report the IPD, in 
order to ensure comparability across countries?  An initial attempt to develop a standard 
methodology, which has also been applied in this paper, is presented in Holzmann et al. 
(2004), but there are still questions and limitations.  Setting standards, on the other hand, 
is likely to be a continuous process.  Indeed, problems of standardization still pervade 
most components of the national accounts in developing countries.  Thus, reporting 
requirements would not need to wait until the perfect methodology is in place.   
 
A second and, arguably, more fundamental question relates to the effects that 
official reports of the IPD would have on the markets for public debt.  Are current 
investors in government debt already discounting the value of the IPD, or will new 
reporting criteria open a Pandora box?  The evidence from the literature is limited and 
refers largely to occupational plans.  For these plans there is some convincing evidence 
supporting the idea that markets do pay attention to and discount unfunded pension 
liabilities.    Bulow, Mφrck, and Summers (1985) report, for instance, that an increase in 
the implicit pension debt of a company is associated with a fall in the value of its equity.  
These results confirm previous findings by Feldstein and Mφrck (1983) and Feldstein and 
Seligman (1981).   Little is known, however, about the relationship between the spreads 
on government debt and the IPD of the mandatory pension systems. The literature on the 
cross-country determinants of spreads is also limited (see Eichengreen and Mody, 2000 
for a review and recent empirical evidence) and has not looked at the impact of the IPD.  
A recent study uses the institutional investors rating (IIR)8 to investigate countries “debt 
tolerance.” (See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, 2003).  The authors show that 
countries with stories of default and high inflation are penalized by the IIR measure, even 
with relatively low levels of debt.9  The implicit pension debt, however, is not taken into 
account in the analysis.10  To our knowledge, the question of how the IPD of mandatory 
systems influences investors’ attitudes towards government debt remains more or less 
open.   
                                                 
8 The IRR is computed twice a year and is based on information provided by economists and sovereign 
risks analysts at leading global banks and security firms.  The ratings grade each country on a scale from 0 
to 100, with a rating of 100 given to those countries perceived as a having the lowest chance of defaulting 
on their government debt obligations. 
9 The analysis on the paper is actually based on the external debt of the country.    
10 Our own preliminary analysis suggests no correlation between the IPD and the IRR.   
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Three cases could be considered.  In the first case investors would already 
discount the value of the IPDs when pricing the government debt.  In this case, formally 
reporting the IPD -- and even making explicit this IPD through the issuance of bonds -- 
would not affect the spreads of government debt.  In the second case, while taking into 
account the IPD when assessing the risk of default of the government, investors would 
have biased expectations about its level.  In fact, often governments and the pension 
funds themselves are not aware of the value of the IPD.  In this case, revealing new 
information about the IPD and the PA would realign expectations and affect spreads.   
The third case, which can co-exist with the second one, would occur when 
investors do not consider current IPDs an important predictor of the risk of default and do 
not take it into account in the calculations of spreads on government debt.  This could be 
because investors expect that governments will default on the IPD rather than on the 
explicit debt or because they expect that governments will continue to roll-over the IPD 
for still a long time.  Since pension crisis tend to be associated with the aging of the 
population, observations of high young dependency ratios and low old dependency ratios 
would sustain these expectations.  In this case, revealing information about the value of 
the IPD would not affect spreads.  However, making the IPD explicit and adding property 
rights – for instance by issuing bonds – could change expectations about the likelihood of 
default and could affect spreads.   
We argue that even in case two, where current spreads are not reflecting the level 
of the implicit pension debt due to investors myopia, countries would be better off by 
being transparent and reporting the IPD and the pay-as-you-go asset.  This is because 
state two is not stable – investors cannot be fooled forever.  Expectations are constantly 
being updated and investor would eventually learn the true financial position of the 
pension funds.  Governments attempt to hide information would then result in over 
borrowing and eventually a financial crisis when investors finally learn the facts and 
refuse to roll-over public debt.  This situation can be avoided if the government discloses 
the value of the IPD along with a credible plan to finance it – in cases where the pay-as-
you-go asset is negative.  In fact, countries adopting this strategy would be more credible 
than countries that do not.  This is simply because the new information on a given 
country would force investors to also update their expectations about the value of the IPD 
in other countries. 
 
At the same time, rating agencies should give higher scores to countries that 
unveil their pension debt than to countries where an IPD of potential similar magnitude is 
not disclosed.  Finally, international organizations should be more forgiving in terms of 
targeted fiscal balances in countries where efforts are being undertaken to disclose, 
control and finance the accumulation of implicit pension debt.  This could imply lower 
surpluses or higher deficits over the short term, but an overall reduction in the present 
value of the public debt.    
 
As a final comment, we emphasize that Governments can make pension liabilities 
“explicit” in different ways.   Jordan, which recently closed to new entrants the schemes 
for civil servants and the military and assumed the payment of the current and new 
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implicit pension debt of the system, simply “added a line” in the budget.  Basically, the 
value of the IPD was disclosed along with a projection of future expenditures to cover the 
deficits of the two pension funds.   These expenditures are treated as current 
expenditures, similar to wages.  As far as we can tell, there were no visible changes in 
spreads of government debt when the closure of the schemes was announced and the IPD 
disclosed.  If anything, the policy intervention should have been taken with relieve by 
investors who saw the government committing to put a halt to the irresponsible 
accumulation of implicit pension debt.  On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that 
investors’ reactions would have been different if the government had issued recognition 
bonds for individuals’ accrued rights.  There is no strong reason to believe that the 
likelihood of default on government bonds (which give property rights to plan members) 
is higher than the likelihood of default on future pension payments through the general 
budget.   
 
We argue that more transparent and explicit instruments could also be considered 
for new pension liabilities in countries preserving earnings related schemes with pay-as-
you-go financing, if these are made solvent.  In this case, the new IPD, which could take 
the form of government bonds (tradable or not) would be backed by the pay-as-you-go 
asset.  Mechanisms would need to be in place, however, to introduce corrections – ideally 
automatic -- when unexpected shocks start to generate systematic divergences between 
the pay-as-you-go asset and the IPD.    
 
In conclusion, more research is necessary to better understand how investors treat 
the IPD of a country and how they react to changes in its level under different economic 
and demographic environments.  At the same time, efforts to systematically estimate 
IPDs across countries should continue.  This information should be made available to 
policymakers and the general public.  What should be the appropriate reporting 
mechanism is a question still open to debate.  We argue, however, that there could be 
important advantages in terms of increased transparency and better fiscal discipline to 
making, at least the new IPD of reformed earnings related schemes with pay-as-you-go 
financing, fully explicit, by investing new contributions in appropriately indexed 
government bonds.  In this case, tolerance levels for the public debt would need to be 
reviewed, in part by looking at the pay-as-you-go asset.   The fiscal implications of this 
approach are explored in a companion paper.   
       
  19
References 
Bulow Jeremy, Randall Morck, and Lawrence Summers.  2000.  “How Doea the Market 
Value Unfunded Pension Liabilities.”   
 
Eichngreen Barry and Ashoka Mody.  2000.  “What Explains Changing Spreads on 
Emerging Market Debt?”   
  
Feldstein M. 1978.  “Do Private Pensions Increase National Savings?” Journal of Public 
Economics 1:277-93. 
 
Feldstein M. and R. Mork. 1983. “Pension funding decisions, interest rate assumptions, 
and share prices.  In Financial Aspects of the United States Pension System, ed. Zvi 
Bodie and John B. Shoven.  Chicago University Press. 
 
Holzmann Robert, Robert Palacios, and Azta Zevine.  2004.  “Implicit Pension Debt:  
Issues, Measurement and Scope in International Perspective.”  Social Protection 
Discussion Paper Series.  N0. 0403.  March.  World Bank.  Washington DC. 
 
International Monetary Fund. 2004. “Debt Sustainability in Low-Income Countries:  
Further Considerations on an Operational Framework and Policy Implications.”  
International Monetary Funds.  Staff Report.  Washington DC. 
 
Reinhart Carmen, Kenneth Rogoff, Miguel Savastano. 2003. “Debt Intolerance.”  
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; 2003; 1; ABI/INFORM Global.  Washington. 
DC. 
 
Robalino David, Edward Whitehouse, Anca Mataoanu, Alberto Musalem, Elizabeth 
Sherwood, Oleksiy Sluchinsky. (2005).  “Pensions in the Middle East and North Africa 
Region: Time for Change.”  World Bank.  Washington DC. 
 
Robalino David.  (forthcoming).  “Financial Sustainability of Earnings Related Pension 
Systems With Pay-as-you-go Financing:  A Role for Government Indexed Bonds.”   
Working Paper.  Washington DC.   
 
Robalino David and  Andras Bodor. (forthcoming).  “Does the Implicit Pension Debt 
Affect the Price of Government Bonds?”  Working Paper.  Washington DC. 
 
World Bank.  2000.  "Modeling Pension Reform. The World Bank's Pension Reform 
Options Simulation Toolkit." Pension Reform Primer Note (2000). World Bank. 
Washington DC. 
 
 
 
  20
Appendix I:  Dynamics of the Public Debt in Selected MENA Countries 
 
Figure A1: Fiscal Balance 
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Figure A2: Central Government Debt 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper breaks down the contingent liability of a mandatory pension system into two 
components:  the implicit pension debt and the pay-as-you-go asset.  It then estimates 
these two components for 12 pension schemes across six MENA countries and presents 
international comparisons.  The results show that implicit pension debts are large (in the 
order of 50% to 100% of GDP), often higher than the explicit public debt.  At the same 
time, the large majority of pension schemes have negative pay-as-you-go assets.  Under 
these circumstances, it is misleading to consider the implicit pension debt a contingency, 
as the government will have to finance it with almost certainty.  In the absence of a 
default the fiscal impacts are expected to be large.  The paper recommends including in 
the assessment of public debt sustainability the implicit liabilities of the mandatory 
pension system and the pay-as-you-go asset.           
 
ﺺّﺨﻠُﻣ 
 
ﻦﻴﻤﺴﻗ ﻰﻟإ ﺔﻴﻣاﺰﻟﻹا ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا ﺔﻤﻈﻧﻷ ﺔﻠﻤﺘﺤﻤﻟا تﺎﻣاﺰﺘﻟﻻا ﺔﺳارﺪﻟا ﻩﺬه ﻢﺴﻘﺗ : ﻂﻄﺨﻟ ﺔﻴﻨﻤﻀﻟا ﺔﻴﻧﻮﻳﺪﻤﻟا
ﻊﺒﻨﻤﻟا ﺪﻨﻋ ﻂﻴﺴﻘﺘﻟﺎﺑ تﺎﻋﺎﻄﺘﻗﻻا ﻦﻣ لﻮﺻﻷاو ،ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا . نﺄﺸﺑ ﻦﻴﻤﺴﻘﻟا ﻦﻳﺬه تاﺮﻳﺪﻘﺗ ﻊﺿﻮﺑ مﻮﻘﺗ ﻢﺛ12 
ﻣ ناﺪﻠﺑ ﻦﻣ ﺔﺘﺳ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺗ تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻣ ﺔﻄﺧﺎﻧرﺎﻘﻣ ضﺮﻋ ﻊﻣ ،ﺎﻴﻘﻳﺮﻓأ لﺎﻤﺷو ﻂﺳوﻷا قﺮﺸﻟا ﺔﻘﻄﻨتﺔﻴﻟود  . ﻦّﻴﺒُﺗو
 ةﺮﻴﺒآ ﺔﻴﻨﻤﻀﻟا تﺎﻴﻧﻮﻳﺪﻤﻟا نأ ﺞﺋﺎﺘﻨﻟا) ﻦﻴﺑ ﺎﻣ ﻞﺼﺗ ﺔﺒﺴﻨﺑ50 و ﺔﺋﺎﻤﻟا ﻲﻓ 100ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟا ﺞﺗﺎﻨﻟا ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺟإ ﻦﻣ ﺔﺋﺎﻤﻟا ﻲﻓ ( ،
ﺢﻳﺮﺼﻟا مﺎﻌﻟا ﻦْﻳّﺪﻟا راﺪﻘﻣ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺒآأ نﻮﻜﺗ ﺎﻣ ًﺎﺒﻟﺎﻏ ﻲهو .ﺔﻴﺒﻟﺎﻏ نأ ﺪﺠﻧ ،ﻪﺴﻔﻧ ﺖﻗﻮﻟا ﻲﻓو ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا ﻂﻄﺧ 
ﺔﻴﺒﻠﺳ ﻊﺒﻨﻤﻟا ﺪﻨﻋ ﻂﻴﺴﻘﺘﻟﺎﺑ تﺎﻋﺎﻄﺘﻗﻻا ﻦﻣ ﺎﻬﻟﻮﺻأ ُتﻻﺪﻌﻣ . رﺎﺒﺘﻋا ﻞّﻠﻀُﻤﻟا ﻦﻣ نﻮﻜﻳ ،عﺎﺿوﻷا ﻩﺬه ّﻞﻇ ﻲﻓو
 تﺎﻣﻮﻜﺤﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ ًﺎﺒﻳﺮﻘﺗ ﺪﻴآﺄﺘﻟﺎﺑ ﻲﻐﺒﻨﻳ ﻪﻧﻷ ﺔﺋرﺎﻄﻟا تﻻﺎﻤﺘﺣﻻا ﻦﻣ ًﺎﻋﻮﻧ ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا ﻂﻄﺨﻟ ﺔﻴﻨﻤﻀﻟا ﺔﻴﻧﻮﻳﺪﻤﻟا
ﺔﻴﻧﻮﻳﺪﻤﻟا ﻚﻠﺗ ﻞﻳﻮﻤﺗ.ًاﺮﻴﺒآ ﺔﻣﺎﻌﻟا ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ ﺮﺛﻷا نﻮﻜﻳ نأ ﻊّﻗﻮﺘﻤﻟا ﻦﻣ نﺈﻓ ،داﺪﺴﻟا ﻦﻋ ﺰﺠﻌﻟا ﻞﺼﺤﻳ ﻢﻟ اذإو  .
 ﺔﻳﺪﻋﺎﻘﺘﻟا تﺎﺷﺎﻌﻤﻟا ﺔﻤﻈﻧﻷ ﺔﻠﻤﺘﺤﻤﻟا تﺎﻣاﺰﺘﻟﻻا مﺎﻌﻟا ﻦْﻳّﺪﻟا ﻞّﻤﺤﺗ ﻰﻠﻋ ةرﺪﻘﻟا تاﺮﻳﺪﻘﺗ ﻦﻴﻤﻀﺘﺑ ﺔﺳارﺪﻟا ﻩﺬه ﻲﺻﻮﺗو
ﻊﺒﻨﻤﻟا ﺪﻨﻋ ﻂﻴﺴﻘﺘﻟﺎﺑ تﺎﻋﺎﻄﺘﻗﻻا ﻦﻣ لﻮﺻﻸﻟو ﺔﻴﻣاﺰﻟﻹا      .   
 
RÉSUMÉ 
 
Le document présente une ventilation du passif éventuel d’un régime de retraite 
obligatoire selon deux composantes : l’endettement implicite du régime de retraite et les 
actifs du régime fondé sur la répartition (« pay-as-you-go »).  Il estime ensuite ces deux 
  ii
composantes pour 12 régimes de retraite de six pays de la région MENA et présente des 
comparaisons internationales.  Les résultats indiquent que l’endettement implicite des 
régimes de retraite est important (de l’ordre de 50 pour cent à 100 pour cent du PIB), et 
qu’il est souvent supérieur à l’endettement public explicite.  Parallèlement, la vaste 
majorité des régimes de retraite font montre d’actifs négatifs pour le régime fondé sur la 
répartition.  Dans ces circonstances, il est erroné de considérer l’endettement implicite 
des régimes de retraite comme un passif, étant pratiquement certain que le gouvernement 
devra le financer.  En l’absence de défaut, les impacts budgétaires sont anticipés 
importants.  Le document recommande d’inclure dans l’évaluation de la viabilité de la 
dette publique, les passifs implicites du régime de retraite obligatoire et les actifs du 
régime fondé sur la répartition.           
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1. Introduction 
The proper measurement and monitoring of the public debt and the total external 
debt of a country are essential for the efficient design of fiscal policy and the prevention 
of financial crisis.  There is an ongoing debate in terms of the most appropriate 
methodology to measure the level of these debts and assess their sustainability (see IMF, 
2004 for a discussion in the case of low-income countries, and a more general discussion 
on debt tolerance by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003).  In all cases, however, the 
implicit liabilities of the mandatory pension funds are excluded from the analysis.  At 
best, the implicit pension debt is treated as a contingent liability of the government and is 
not reported as part of the public debt.  Unfortunately, it can be shown that when the 
pension system is not solvent, a large component of the implicit pension debt is actually 
not “contingent.”  The probability that the government will have to repay – or default on 
this debt – is very close to one.  Excluding this non-contingent component from the 
assessment of public debt sustainability can therefore seriously bias the design and 
implementation of fiscal policy. 
The objectives of this paper are to describe the true nature of the contingent 
liability of the pension systems in selected MENA countries and asses its fiscal 
implications.  We start by breaking down the contingent pension liability into two 
components:  the implicit pension debt (IPD) and the so called pay-as-you-go asset (PA).  
We then estimate the value of these two components for 12 schemes across 6 MENA 
countries1 and benchmark the results against those observed in other countries.2  To 
assess potential fiscal implications, we compute the change in the fiscal balance 
necessary to reduce the debt/GDP ratio by a given fraction over some period of time, 
resulting from the inclusion of the IPD in the debt sustainability analysis. 
The core of the paper is organized in 4 sections.  Section 2 sets the analytical 
framework by presenting the traditional definition of public debt and characterizing the 
contingent liability of the mandatory pension system.  Section 3 describes the methods 
and the data used to estimate IPDs and pay-as-you-go assets.  Section 4 presents the 
results of the analysis and assesses fiscal impacts.  Section 5 concludes and 
discusses policy implications. 
2. Public Debt and Contingent Pension Liabilities 
The public debt, as defined in Government Financial Statistics of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), incorporates public and publicly guaranteed obligations of the 
central, municipal, and local governments -- as well as other public entities -- with non-
government institutions.  Although not included directly in the calculation of the public 
debt, the definition recognizes the existence of contingent liabilities of various public 
institutions (e.g., state owned enterprises, banks) as well as the pension funds.   In this 
                                                 
1 Countries have been selected on the basis of available information. 
2 The calculation of the IPD is based on the methodology developed in Holzmann et al. (2004), which 
normalizes assumptions to make results comparable across countries.   
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section we show why treating the implicit debt of the pension funds as a contingency can 
be misleading. 
In an earnings related pension system that is not fully funded, current promises to 
pay pensions (pension rights accrued to date) are backed by available reserves as well as 
future contributions net of future pension payments ensuing from these contributions – 
the so called pay-as-you-go asset.  The contingent liability of the pension funds, on the 
other hand, is often interpreted as the part of future obligations that, with some 
probability, cannot be covered by future revenues.    Formally, the contingent liability can 
be defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] tpct RALLECPL −−+= θθθ ;;; sw,,N,Nsp,,Nsw,,N ncpc ,   (1)   
where E is the expectations operator, Lc(.) gives the liabilities of the pension system with 
current contributors (Nc), which depend on current and future average wages by age (w), 
a vector of current and future survival probabilities by age (s), and the parameters of the 
system (θ); Lp gives the liabilities with current beneficiaries (Np), which depend  on the 
current distribution of pensions (p), survival probabilities, and system parameters (e.g., 
pension indexation mechanisms); and A(.) is the pay-as-you-go asset, which depends on 
current and new contributors  (Nn), as well as wages, survival probabilities, and system 
parameters; and  Rt represents current reserves.   The implicit pension liability (IPD) of 
the system, the accrued to date liability, is given by Lc(.) + Lp(.).   
In a solvent pension system one would expect the contingent liability to be equal 
to or less than zero.  In other words, the expected implicit pension liability net of reserves 
would be at least equal to the expected pay-as-you-go asset.  Any deviation from 
equilibrium would not be systematic, but rather the result of unexpected shocks.  Under 
some designs, automatic rules that adjust θ to changes in the demographic and economic 
environment could even eliminate the contingent pension liability.  In this case, the IPD 
net of reserves would be equal to the pay-as-you-go asset in all states of nature. 
When the pension system is insolvent, however, the expected contingent liability 
is positive.  That is, under average conditions, the IPD net of reserves would be above the 
pay-as-you-go asset.  At the extreme, it is possible to observe an expected pay-as-you-go 
asset which is negative.  Indeed, it can be shown that the pay-as-you-go asset is equal to 
the accrued to date pension liabilities (IPD) plus the present value of future cash-balances 
(which is the negative of the so called financing gap, FG, of the system).  Formally, over 
the infinite horizon, we have: 
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where c are contributions at time t, pe are pension payments accrued by the new 
contributions of current plan members; pn are pension payments accrued by the 
contributions of new entrants to the system, pp are pension payments to current 
beneficiaries, and pc are pension payments to current contributors for the pension rights 
that they have accrued to date. Hence, if the financing gap of the system is large enough 
(higher than the IPD), the pay-as-you-go asset of the pension system becomes negative.  
Basically, future contributions do not generate a surplus in present value that can be used 
to finance the IPD. On the contrary, the new contributions bring new liabilities that 
themselves cannot be financed by the system.  In other words, keeping the system open to 
new contributions worsens its long-term financial position.       
 
Having a negative pay-as-you-go asset has important fiscal implications because 
it implies that only general revenues can be used to finance the IPD.3  Governments can 
delay the use of general revenues by continuing to “borrow” contributions to pay 
pensions, but because these new contributions also bring new pension liabilities, the 
situation eventually becomes explosive.  Under these circumstances, the liabilities of the 
pension funds do not represent a contingency for the government but rather a real debt 
that, in the absence of default, sooner or later will need to be financed.  When this is the 
case, excluding the IPD from the analysis of fiscal sustainability of the public debt can 
lead to severely biased policy recommendations.   
The next two sections of this paper are concerned with the estimation of the IPD 
and the pay-as-you-go asset of pension systems in various MENA countries.   
3.  Methods and Data  
The implicit pension debt is defined here as the accrued-to-date liabilities, or the 
PBO (projected benefit obligation).  It is equal to the present value of the benefits the 
pension system will have to pay to its current participants (and their survivors) on the 
basis of their pension rights accrued prior to the year for which the IPD is calculated.  
The calculation of benefits is made on the basis of future wages (i.e., wages at the time of 
retirement).  Neither future contributions nor new pension rights are included in the 
calculation.   Thus, the IPD shows how much it would cost to discontinue the pension 
scheme and pay out all obligations (see Holzmann et al., 2004 for a review of various 
measures of pension liabilities). 
                                                 
3 Here we abstract from the existence of reserves.  As shown later these are usually very low relative to the 
level of the IPD. 
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Our estimates of the IPD are based on the World Bank PROST (Pension Reform 
Options Simulation Toolkit) model.  Given limited information in most middle and low-
income countries about the vesting period of current contributors and their turnover rates, 
when computing pension payments for new retirees PROST uses little information about 
“their past.”  Thus, it is not possible to differentiate between those future new retirees 
who are contributors today and those future new retirees who enrolled in the system at a 
latter date.  Similarly, in the case of future new retirees who are contributors today, it is 
not possible to distinguish between the part of the pension that is associated with rights 
accumulated to date, and pension rights accumulated through new contributions.  In 
essence, for all new retirees of age a at time t, PROST computes the pension on the basis 
of an estimate of the average length of service at retirement.  However, because the 
pension payments in year t are related to both pension rights accrued to the date of 
computing the IPD and pension rights resulting from new contributions (of current and 
new plan members), a mechanism is necessary to separate the two.  For simplicity, 
PROST increases the share of pension rights accrued from new contributions in direct 
proportion to time.  As an illustration, assume that the calculation of the IPD is made at 
time t=0, that the average retirement age is 55, and that the youngest age at which 
individuals join the system is 20.  PROST in this case infers that the pension payments to 
new retirees in year t=1 are all the result of contributions made during the last 35 (55-20) 
years (i.e., are related to the pension rights accrued to date by current contributors).  As t 
increases, however, the role of past years of contributions has to diminish.  Hence, for 
year t=2, PROST reduces the share of past years by 1/35 -- since pension payments to 
new retirees now can reflect on year of new contributions.  Similarly, in year t=3 the 
share of past years of contributions is reduced by 2/35 and by 3/35 in year t=4.  At some 
point in time, past years of contributions are no longer associated with the pension 
payments to new retirees, as these result entirely from pension rights accrued through 
new contributions.   
 
Formally, the accrued to date liability with current contributors is given by: 
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where NPy,g is the number of new retirees of sex g in year y, RA_NPt,g is the average 
retirement age of all new retirees of sex g in year t, EA is the age of the youngest 
contributor, ρ is the discount rate, and PV_NPy,g is the average present value at time y of 
the stream of pension payments made to new retirees of sex g between times y and T.  
For each of these new retirees the present value of the future pension payments is itself 
given by: 
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where a indexes the age of the individual, i indexes the income category, NB is the first 
pension payment to the new retiree, B represents the indexed pension at time y, and ma 
the mortality rate at age a.  A similar approach is used to allocate disability pensions. 
 
The method described above for the calculation of the implicit pension debt with 
current contributors has proven to provide a reasonable approximation of the “true” IPD 
in the case systems that have been in operation for over 20 to 30 years.  Thus, it is 
suitable for all pension schemes analyzed in this paper.  For younger systems, or systems 
that start from scratch, the methodology just described tends to overestimate the IPD, as 
too much weight is given the accrued rights of current contributors. 
 
The liabilities to current beneficiaries comprise liabilities to old age pensioners, 
disabled, survivors and orphans.  The IPD to current old age pensioners is calculated in a 
more precise way than to current contributors, by following the current age-sex cohorts of 
beneficiaries over time.  Formally, the IPD is defined by: 
 
∑ ⋅=
gia
gtiagtiat OAPOAPPVOAPIPD
,,
,,,,,,__ ,       (5)    
 
where PV_OAPa,i,t,g is the present value of the stream of pension payments to a pensioner 
of age a and sex g, in income category i (see equation 4); and OAPa,i,t,g is the number of 
these individuals.  A similar approach is used to compute the implicit liabilities of current 
disabled.  Obligations to survivors (widows/widowers and orphans) are estimated with a 
lesser precision. PROST assumes that the share of obligations to survivors in the total 
IPD to existing old age pensioners and disabled is the same as the share of survivor 
pension expenditures on total expenditures.    
Data and Assumptions 
We estimate the implicit pension debt and the pay-as-you-go asset for 12 pension 
systems across 6 countries in the region.  These countries have been selected on the basis 
of data availability.  In the context of a cross country analysis, it is essential to find the 
right balance between taking into account the idiosyncrasy of a country’s pension system, 
on the one hand, and the comparability of the results, on the other.  To this end, we 
follow the methodology and assumptions developed by Holzmann et al. (2004), which 
allows for international comparisons.  Below we describe the key data and assumptions 
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regarding demographic dynamics, coverage, retirement patterns, benefit formulas, the 
finances of the system, and the macroeconomy.   
Demography.  Population projections are important to compute the pay-as-you-go 
asset because they determine the number of scheme participants by sex and age.   The 
projections are based on information provided by the World Bank’s Population Unit 
regarding the initial population by age and gender, and projections of age-specific 
fertility and mortality rates for each country. In line with international trends, mortality 
rates are assumed to decrease over time resulting in growing life expectancy, while 
fertility rates gradually converge to reproduction level (see Table 1). Decreasing 
mortality and fertility rates result in population aging and growing system dependency 
rates. 
To follow the different cohorts of contributors and beneficiaries over time, 
nationwide mortality rates are applied to the members of all schemes.  This is because of 
the lack of mortality rates which are specific to plan members.  The use of nationwide 
mortality rates adds some bias to the projections as coverage rates are relatively low and 
those who participate in the system are generally middle and high income individuals 
(particularly in the case of civil servants) who are expected to have longer life 
expectancies.  This would underestimate the implicit pension debt. 
Contributors.  The initial number of contributors and beneficiaries and their 
distribution by age and sex are based on actual data provided by the respective pension 
funds.  The initial age distributions of contributors for all considered schemes are 
compared on Figure 1.  Private sector schemes are shown on the left-hand side chart, 
public sector schemes on the right-hand side.  In general, schemes for civil servants have 
a more mature population because often they were created first.     
 
Table 1:  Expected Dynamics of Life Expectancy and Fertility Rates 
 Base Year 2020 2040 2060 2075 
Life Expectancy at Birth      
Djibouti 42.5 49.8 59.3 67.6 71.7 
Iran 69.5 74.5 77.5 81.7 84.5 
Jordan 71.3 75.3 77.4 79.9 81.5 
Lebanon 70.3 74.0 76.8 79.9 82.8 
Morocco 68.1 71.9 74.5 77.3 79.6 
West Bank&Gaza 72.3 75.4 77.3 79.3 80.8 
Total Fertility Rates      
Djibouti 493% 314% 241% 221% 213% 
Iran 250% 211% 210% 208% 207% 
Jordan 350% 209% 208% 207% 207% 
Lebanon 225% 210% 209% 208% 207% 
Morocco 273% 213% 210% 209% 207% 
West Bank&Gaza 485% 309% 214% 210% 206% 
Source:  WB Population Unit. 
To project the stock of future contributors by age and sex it is assumed, for all 
schemes and all countries, that current population coverage rates by age and gender 
remain constant (see Figure 2).  This normalization is introduced to facilitate cross-
  7
country comparisons.  However, it is important to note that in the presence of growing 
labor force participation rates, the assumption of constant population coverage implies 
declining labor force coverage.  This is particularly relevant for women in MENA 
countries for whom participation in the labor market is increasing rapidly.  In the case of 
insolvent systems, and with reasonable estimates for the discount rate, this assumption 
would overestimate the value of the pay-as-you-go asset.  
Beneficiaries.  Projections of the future number of disabled and survivors are 
done, similarly, by holding constant over time the beneficiary to population ratio in each 
age and gender cohort.  The old age pensioners are modeled in a more complicated way.  
The initial age distribution of the stock of old age pensioners in each pension scheme is 
given (see Figure 3).  For the future, the underlying assumption is that retirement rates,4  
for all ages for which there are retirees today, eventually converge to the current (base 
year) maximum participation rate across plan members of all ages.  For instance, if the 
maximum ratio between the population of contributors, disabled, and retirees and the 
total population is 50 percent (observed say at age 40), then the assumption is that over 
the medium term retirement rates for all ages will converge to 50%.  Basically, if 50% is 
the maximum observed share of individuals of a given age and sex who are in the system 
today, then 50% becomes a ceiling for the share of individuals across ages and gender 
who can be retired when the system matures.     
 
  
Figure 1:  Age Distribution of Current Contributors 
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Source:  Various pension funds 
 
                                                 
4 Here by retirement rates we understand the share of old age pensioners and disabled in the population of a 
given gender at a given age. 
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Figure 2:  Current Coverage Rates of the Population of Contributors 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 3:  Age Distribution of Current Old-Age Pensioners 
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Benefit formulas and eligibility conditions.  Key system parameters such as the 
contribution rate, the ceiling on the covered wage, the retirement age and the vesting 
periods, penalties for early retirement, the income measure, the accrual rate, and rules for 
revalorizing wages and indexing pensions are based on the latest legislations.5  
Unfortunately, most countries use ad-hoc or discretionary mechanisms to index pensions 
and revalorize wages.  Hence, in the simulations we follow the approach presented in 
Holzmann et al. (2004) and consider two scenarios:  one in which the growth rate of the 
average covered wage is used to revalorized wages and index pensions, and a second 
where prices are used (the indexation to prices is implicit since all the projections are 
made in real terms).  The revalorization mechanism can have an important impact in the 
level of the IPD in schemes with “long” averaging periods that do not revalorize wages, 
such as the OPS in Djibouti (10 years) and the CNSS in Morocco (8 years).   
Revenues and expenditures in the pension systems.  In the projections, only 
pension related revenues and expenditures are considered in all schemes. Payments under 
social assistance programs and other non-pension expenditures, e.g. health care or 
                                                 
5 Any reforms that are being introduced after the beginning of the simulation period are taken into account 
if they were enacted prior to the base year. 
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unemployment benefits, – if they are covered by the pension or social security fund – are 
excluded.  Contributions or transfers to cover these expenditures are also excluded.6    
Any negative pension balance or explicit accumulated debt of the pension system 
at the beginning of the simulation period is ignored – which is the case for CSRO (Iran).  
This assumes that the initial system deficit has been covered by the government’s budget.  
The current reserves of the system are also not taken into account in the projections.  
Basically, for transparency purposes, investment income is ignored.  
Wages.  Actual data on the current average wage of the covered population in 
each of the modeled schemes are used in the simulations.  However, gender differences in 
wages are uniformly ignored even in cases where information about gender distribution 
of wages is available.  In addition, the age profile of wages is normalized across 
countries.  This is important to compare schemes with different income measures, 
particularly when past wages are not revalorized as a function of the growth rate of the 
average covered wage or inflation.  We assume that a one year increase in the age is 
accompanied, on average, by a 1 percentage point increase in wages.  This pattern 
reflects the overall trend observed around the world (see Holzmann et al., 2004).   
Macroeconomy.  To look at the different systems in a comparable economic 
environment, normalized macroeconomic projections are used based on the following 
assumptions:  (i) real GDP growth rate is 4%; (ii) productivity growth is 2%; and (iii) the 
inflation rate is zero (i.e., projections are conducted in real terms).  As IPD estimates are 
highly sensitive to the discount rate used in present value calculations, simulations were 
done with a range of discount rates varying from a low 2% to a relatively high 5%. 
Higher discount rates not only reduce the level of the IPDs for all schemes but in some 
cases they also change their relative position, depending on whether their future unfunded 
liabilities are more front- or back-loaded.  Hence, schemes that have larger expected 
payments further down the road are favored by high discount rates.   
4. Results from the Analysis 
The results of the calculations for the various schemes in the six MENA countries 
are presented in Table 2 .  The first six columns provide estimates of the implicit pension 
debt, while the last six columns present estimates of the pay-as-you-go asset.  Each 
column refers to a combination of the indexation factor for pensions and the discount 
rate. 
A first observation is that in all cases the IPDs are sizable, in general higher for 
the schemes for private sector workers than for the scheme for civil servants (the 
exception is Morocco).  This is not explained by more generosity in the schemes for 
                                                 
6 The following “pension related” contribution rates are assumed: CNR (Djibouti) – 20% (pensioners – 
10.2%); OPS (Djibouti) – 8% (pensioners – 10.9%); CSRO (Iran) – 22.5%; SSO (Iran) – 18%; SSC 
(Jordan) – 16.5%; civil servants and military (Lebanon) – 6%; CMR (Morocco) – 17%; CNSS (Morocco) – 
9.1%; RCAR (Morocco) – 18%; West Bank – 2%; Gaza – 22.5% (however, currently nobody actually pays 
contributions).  The assumed collection rate is based on the actual data on the current status for each 
scheme 
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private sector workers, the opposite tends to be true (see Robalino et al. 2005), but simply 
by a larger contributory base.        
Among the four schemes for private sector workers reviewed (Djibouti OPS, Iran 
SSO, Jordan SSC, and Morocco CNSS) the largest IPDs across scenarios are observed in 
Jordan (between 84% and 240% of GDP), followed by Djibouti (67% - 151%), Iran (32% 
- 82%) and Morocco (22%-50%).  Among the schemes for civil servants the highest IPDs 
are observed in the West Bank and Gaza (between 45% and 121% of GDP), followed 
closely by Morocco (between 45% and 111% of GDP) and then Iran (21%  - 52%), 
Djibouti (12% - 23%) and Lebanon (11% - 25%).  In the only military scheme analyzed 
(Lebanon) the IPD ranges between 29% and 78% of GDP.  The lowest IPDs (between 
4% and 11% of GDP) are observed in the scheme for public sector contractual workers in 
Morocco (the RCAR), which is both smaller and better designed than the other schemes 
(see Robalino et al., 2005).   
 
Regarding pay-as-you-go assets an important finding of this paper is that in most 
systems there are none.7  With the exception of the CNR in Djibouti (recently reformed) 
and the RCAR in Morocco, all schemes have large pay-as-you-go liabilities (i.e., the pay-
as-you-go assets are negative).  In Jordan, estimates of pay-as-you-go liabilities for the 
next 75 years range between 2 and 14 times GDP.  With a discount rate of 4% and price 
indexation of pensions, future liabilities could represent 3 times today GDP.  Under the 
same scenario future liabilities in WBG, Iran and Lebanon would represent 3, 2 and 1.7 
times current GDPs respectively.  Only in Morocco and Djibouti would future pay-as-
you-go liabilities be below current GDP (50% and 10% respectively). 
 
Negative pay-as-you-go assets imply that having the pension systems open to new 
entrants (and new contributions) worsens their financial position.  This is because future 
generations will not generate a “surplus” to cover the pensions of current plan members.  
Thus, in the absence of a default, the IPD can only be financed through general revenues.  
It is therefore important to take into account these liabilities when assessing the fiscal 
sustainability of the public debt.     
                                                 
7 It is important to note that the estimates of the pay-as-you-go asset presented in Table 2 overestimate the 
“true” pay-as-you-go asset.  This is because the calculations do not take into account the implicit pension 
liability of the system in year 2075. 
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Table 2:  Implicit Pension Debt and Pay-as-you-go Assets for Pension Scheme in 
MENA Countries 
Country 
Scheme 
IPD  
wage 
IPD  
price 
IPD    
wage 
IPD  
price 
IPD  
wage 
IPD  
price 
PA   
wage 
PA    
price 
PA   
wage 
PA    
price 
PA   
wage 
PA    
price 
  2% 2% 4% 4% 5% 5% 2% 2% 4% 4% 5% 5% 
Djibouti              
CNR 23 19 17 14 14 12 23 36 21 25 18 21 
OPS 151 113 102 79 86 67 -309 -172 -262 -35 -38 -10 
Total 174 132 119 93 100 79 -286 -136 119 -10 -20 11 
Iran             
CSRO 52 38 33 25 27 21 -197 -136 -61 -41 -33 -21 
SSO 82 64 48 39 38 32 -536 -420 -171 -133 -97 -74 
Total 134 102 81 64 65 53 -733 -556 -232 -174 -130 -95 
Jordan             
SSC 240 173 140 105 110 84 -
1402 
-996 -444 -307 -251 -169 
Total 240 173 140 105 110 84 -
1402 
-996 -444 -307 -206 -169 
Lebanon              
CS  25 20 16 13 13 11 -99 -82 -36 -31 -23 -19 
Milit. 1 58 43 41 32 35 29 -205 -176 -91 -80 -65 -56 
Milit. 2  78 57 53 41 45 36 -323 -265 -139 -116 -96 -81 
Total 1 83 63 57 45 48 40 -304 -258 -127 -111 -88 -75 
 Total 2 103 77 69 54 58 47 -422 -347 -175 -147 -119 -100 
Morocco              
CNSS 50 40 32 26 26 22 -154 -117 -47 -34 -26 -18 
CMR 111 84 70 55 57 45 -241 -121 -70 -28 -35 -10 
RCAR 11 7 7 5 6 4 -15 3 0 7 3 7 
Total 172 131 109 86 89 71 -410 -235 -117 -55 -58 -21 
WBG             
WB   68 50 42 32 34 26 -318 -239 -112 -85 -68 -53 
Gaza  53 40 30 24 23 19 -473 -353 -163 -124 -100 -76 
Total 121 90 72 56 57 45 -791 -592 -275 -209 -168 -129 
Note:  The pay-as-you-go asset presented in this table excludes the implicit pension liability of the system 
at the end of the simulation horizon.  Therefore, it overestimates the “true”  pay-as-you-go asset.   
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
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International comparisons show that, despite still favorable demographic 
conditions in most MENA countries, the estimated IPDs are not among the lowest in the 
world (see Table 3).  In fact, only Eastern European countries, which have older 
populations and much higher coverage rates, tend to have larger IPDs than Jordan, 
Djibouti and Morocco.  The IPD for Lebanon is among the lowest in the world, while the 
IPD for Iran and WBG are in the middle of the distribution for non-European countries.     
 
Several factors can explain the international variation of observed IPD/GDP 
ratios, including the generosity of the system, the level of coverage, its demographic 
structure, and the level of wages.  Holzmann et al. (2004) showed that the current level of 
pension expenditures can in fact explain up to 60 percent of the international variation of 
the IPD/GDP ratio.  Adding our countries to the original model changes little the results 
(see Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4:  IPDs and Pension Expenditures at the International Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The doted line refers to the equation estimated in this paper.  The 
continuous line is from Holzmann et al. 2004.   
Source:  Holzmann et al. 2004 and authors’ calculations. 
 
When this simple model is applied to Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, 
for which no data are currently available to directly estimate the IPD, we obtain estimates 
of 109%, 108%, 91%, 129% and 67% of GDP respectively.  Clearly, these estimates 
incorporate a large error, but one can be confident that IPDs in these countries are above 
50 percent of GDP.  
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Table 3:  International Comparison of IPDs in Selected MENA Countries 
Country 
IPD 
(Wages/2%) 
IPD 
(Prices/2%) 
IPD 
(Wages/4%) 
IPD 
(Prices/4%) 
IPD 
(Wages/5%) 
IPD 
(Prices/5%) 
Brazil 500 362 330 248 275 211 
Macedonia 441 356 291 241 244 204 
Poland 379 304 261 212 220 181 
Ukraine 365 292 257 211 220 183 
Romania 386 292 256 199 214 169 
Uruguay 295 246 214 182 187 160 
Portugal 358 271 233 181 193 151 
Hungary 300 212 203 150 171 128 
Turkey 217 154 146 109 123 93 
Jordan 240 173 140 105 110 84 
Costa Rica 203 163 121 100 97 80 
Djibouti 174 132 119 93 100 79 
Morocco 172 131 109 86 89 71 
Philippines 185 146 107 85 81 66 
Argentina 106 91 85 75 78 70 
Iran 146 110 89 70 72 57 
Bolivia 111 92 73 65 62 55 
Iran 134 102 81 64 65 53 
WBG 121 90 72 56 57 45 
México 101 84 65 54 54 45 
Chile 77 64 60 50 53 45 
Ecuador 103 78 63 49 51 40 
Colombia 88 73 56 48 46 39 
Lebanon 83 63 57 45 48 40 
Mauritius 63 46 47 37 42 33 
Senegal 73 51 51 37 44 32 
Peru 57 51 40 35 34 30 
El Salvador 60 46 43 34 37 29 
Korea 57 35 33 21 26 17 
       
Average 193 149 128 101 107 86 
Countries sorted by the IPD valued at a 4% discount rate using price indexation. 
Source:  For MENA countries authors’ calculations.  For other countries Holzmann et al. 2004. 
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It is informative to compare the IPD with the explicit public debt.  Assuming that 
pensions are indexed by prices and that the discount rate is 4% per year, the estimated 
IPDs in five of the six countries are equal or above the explicit public debt (Table 4 ).  In 
Iran, for instance, the IPD represents 3.2 times the explicit public debt.  Only in Lebanon 
is the IPD relatively low compared to the public debt (25%).  This is because the explicit 
pubic debt is considerably high (over 170% of GDP) but also because there is no pension 
scheme for private sector workers.   
 
To assess the fiscal impact that the implicit pension debt can have we look at the 
fiscal balance necessary to achieve a given reduction of the debt/GDP ratio over a given 
period of time.  Formally, this fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP in each year is given 
by:     
 
( ) ( )( )[ ]( )
( ) ( )1* 11 1111 +−+ −+−−+= nn
nn
r
gxrb θ
θβ ,       (6) 
where β is the debt/GDP ratio, x is the targeted fractional reduction, n is the period of 
time (measured in number of years), r is the interest rate on the debt, g the growth rate of 
GDP, and θ = (1+g)/(1+r).  Clearly, as β and x increase, so does the required fiscal 
balance b*.   
Figure 5 graphs b* as a function of n for three values of β (0.20; 1; and 2) under the 
assumption that x=0.5 (50% reduction), g=0.04, and r=0.05.  We observe that a doubling 
of the debt to GDP ratio also implies a doubling of the fiscal balance necessary to achieve 
a given reduction in this ratio. 
 
Figure 5:  Public Debt and the Fiscal Balance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure is based on equation (6).  The values of the relevant parameters are x=0.5; 
g=0.04; and r=0.05. 
Source:  Authors’  calculations 
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the conservative assumption that pensions are indexed with prices and that the discount 
rate is 4% per year.  The first two columns provide information about the fiscal balance 
necessary to reduce the public debt by 50% over a period of 10 years.  The next two 
columns refer to the case where the 50% reduction is achieved over a period of 20 years, 
while the last two columns consider a period of 30 years.   
 
Table 4:  Fiscal Balance Necessary to Reduce the Public Debt With and 
Without IPD (% GDP) 
 
   
Reduce debt by 
half in 10 years 
Reduce debt by 
half in 20 years 
Reduce debt by 
half in 30 years 
  
Explicit 
Public 
Debt 
Implicit 
Pension 
Debt 
(IPD) 
Explicit 
Public 
Debt 
Only 
With 
IPD 
Explicit 
Public 
Debt 
Only 
With 
IPD 
Explicit 
Public 
Debt 
Only 
With 
IPD 
Djibouti 65% 93% 3.38% 8.22% 2.00% 4.85% 1.51% 3.66% 
Iran 20% 64% 1.04% 4.37% 0.61% 2.58% 0.46% 1.95% 
Jordan 110% 105% 5.72% 11.18% 3.38% 6.60% 2.55% 4.98% 
Lebanon 175% 45% 9.10% 11.44% 5.37% 6.76% 4.06% 5.10% 
Morocco 70% 86% 3.64% 8.11% 2.15% 4.79% 1.62% 3.62% 
Calculations assume that the GDP grows at 4% per year and that the interest on the debt is 4% per year. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
The results of the calculations confirm that current pension liabilities have 
important implications for fiscal policy.  Looking at the case of a 50% reduction over a 
10 year period, the inclusion of the IPD implies increases in the fiscal balances necessary 
to achieve the targets, between 2.34 percentage points in the case of Lebanon to up to 
5.46 percentage points in the case of Jordan.  With a longer period (30 years) the 
increases in the fiscal balances would be less traumatic, but still substantial:   between 1 
percentage point in the case of Lebanon to 2.4 percentage points in the case of Jordan.    
5. Discussion and Policy Implications 
This paper has shown that the contingent liabilities of the government can be 
decomposed into the implicit pension debt (IPD) and the pay-as-you-go asset (PA).  
Estimates for 12 pension schemes across 6 countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
show that IPDs are considerably high (in the order of 50 to over 100 percent of GDP) and 
always above the explicit public debt.  At the same time, the large majority of the 
schemes analyzed have negative pay-as-you-go assets. 
 
The implication is that, in the absence of default, current IPDs can only be 
financed out of current reserves – in general small relative to the IPD – and general 
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revenues.  Governments can continue to “roll-over” the pension debt by “borrowing” new 
contributions, but this will only delay and aggravate the problem.  It follows that 
considering the implicit pension liabilities as contingencies, as opposed to regular debt, 
can severely bias the design of fiscal policy and the assessment of debt sustainability.  
The paper has shown that the fiscal balance targets necessary to reduce debt/GDP ratios 
can change dramatically depending on whether the calculations include or not the IPD.    
 
The natural recommendation is to formally require countries to report the value of 
the IPD and the pay-as-you-go asset as part of the portfolio of public sector obligations 
and to devise appropriate financing mechanisms.  There are, however, questions that will 
need to be addressed before countries start to move in this direction.   
 
One question is what should be the standards to compute and report the IPD, in 
order to ensure comparability across countries?  An initial attempt to develop a standard 
methodology, which has also been applied in this paper, is presented in Holzmann et al. 
(2004), but there are still questions and limitations.  Setting standards, on the other hand, 
is likely to be a continuous process.  Indeed, problems of standardization still pervade 
most components of the national accounts in developing countries.  Thus, reporting 
requirements would not need to wait until the perfect methodology is in place.   
 
A second and, arguably, more fundamental question relates to the effects that 
official reports of the IPD would have on the markets for public debt.  Are current 
investors in government debt already discounting the value of the IPD, or will new 
reporting criteria open a Pandora box?  The evidence from the literature is limited and 
refers largely to occupational plans.  For these plans there is some convincing evidence 
supporting the idea that markets do pay attention to and discount unfunded pension 
liabilities.    Bulow, Mφrck, and Summers (1985) report, for instance, that an increase in 
the implicit pension debt of a company is associated with a fall in the value of its equity.  
These results confirm previous findings by Feldstein and Mφrck (1983) and Feldstein and 
Seligman (1981).   Little is known, however, about the relationship between the spreads 
on government debt and the IPD of the mandatory pension systems. The literature on the 
cross-country determinants of spreads is also limited (see Eichengreen and Mody, 2000 
for a review and recent empirical evidence) and has not looked at the impact of the IPD.  
A recent study uses the institutional investors rating (IIR)8 to investigate countries “debt 
tolerance.” (See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, 2003).  The authors show that 
countries with stories of default and high inflation are penalized by the IIR measure, even 
with relatively low levels of debt.9  The implicit pension debt, however, is not taken into 
account in the analysis.10  To our knowledge, the question of how the IPD of mandatory 
systems influences investors’ attitudes towards government debt remains more or less 
open.   
                                                 
8 The IRR is computed twice a year and is based on information provided by economists and sovereign 
risks analysts at leading global banks and security firms.  The ratings grade each country on a scale from 0 
to 100, with a rating of 100 given to those countries perceived as a having the lowest chance of defaulting 
on their government debt obligations. 
9 The analysis on the paper is actually based on the external debt of the country.    
10 Our own preliminary analysis suggests no correlation between the IPD and the IRR.   
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Three cases could be considered.  In the first case investors would already 
discount the value of the IPDs when pricing the government debt.  In this case, formally 
reporting the IPD -- and even making explicit this IPD through the issuance of bonds -- 
would not affect the spreads of government debt.  In the second case, while taking into 
account the IPD when assessing the risk of default of the government, investors would 
have biased expectations about its level.  In fact, often governments and the pension 
funds themselves are not aware of the value of the IPD.  In this case, revealing new 
information about the IPD and the PA would realign expectations and affect spreads.   
The third case, which can co-exist with the second one, would occur when 
investors do not consider current IPDs an important predictor of the risk of default and do 
not take it into account in the calculations of spreads on government debt.  This could be 
because investors expect that governments will default on the IPD rather than on the 
explicit debt or because they expect that governments will continue to roll-over the IPD 
for still a long time.  Since pension crisis tend to be associated with the aging of the 
population, observations of high young dependency ratios and low old dependency ratios 
would sustain these expectations.  In this case, revealing information about the value of 
the IPD would not affect spreads.  However, making the IPD explicit and adding property 
rights – for instance by issuing bonds – could change expectations about the likelihood of 
default and could affect spreads.   
We argue that even in case two, where current spreads are not reflecting the level 
of the implicit pension debt due to investors myopia, countries would be better off by 
being transparent and reporting the IPD and the pay-as-you-go asset.  This is because 
state two is not stable – investors cannot be fooled forever.  Expectations are constantly 
being updated and investor would eventually learn the true financial position of the 
pension funds.  Governments attempt to hide information would then result in over 
borrowing and eventually a financial crisis when investors finally learn the facts and 
refuse to roll-over public debt.  This situation can be avoided if the government discloses 
the value of the IPD along with a credible plan to finance it – in cases where the pay-as-
you-go asset is negative.  In fact, countries adopting this strategy would be more credible 
than countries that do not.  This is simply because the new information on a given 
country would force investors to also update their expectations about the value of the IPD 
in other countries. 
 
At the same time, rating agencies should give higher scores to countries that 
unveil their pension debt than to countries where an IPD of potential similar magnitude is 
not disclosed.  Finally, international organizations should be more forgiving in terms of 
targeted fiscal balances in countries where efforts are being undertaken to disclose, 
control and finance the accumulation of implicit pension debt.  This could imply lower 
surpluses or higher deficits over the short term, but an overall reduction in the present 
value of the public debt.    
 
As a final comment, we emphasize that Governments can make pension liabilities 
“explicit” in different ways.   Jordan, which recently closed to new entrants the schemes 
for civil servants and the military and assumed the payment of the current and new 
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implicit pension debt of the system, simply “added a line” in the budget.  Basically, the 
value of the IPD was disclosed along with a projection of future expenditures to cover the 
deficits of the two pension funds.   These expenditures are treated as current 
expenditures, similar to wages.  As far as we can tell, there were no visible changes in 
spreads of government debt when the closure of the schemes was announced and the IPD 
disclosed.  If anything, the policy intervention should have been taken with relieve by 
investors who saw the government committing to put a halt to the irresponsible 
accumulation of implicit pension debt.  On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that 
investors’ reactions would have been different if the government had issued recognition 
bonds for individuals’ accrued rights.  There is no strong reason to believe that the 
likelihood of default on government bonds (which give property rights to plan members) 
is higher than the likelihood of default on future pension payments through the general 
budget.   
 
We argue that more transparent and explicit instruments could also be considered 
for new pension liabilities in countries preserving earnings related schemes with pay-as-
you-go financing, if these are made solvent.  In this case, the new IPD, which could take 
the form of government bonds (tradable or not) would be backed by the pay-as-you-go 
asset.  Mechanisms would need to be in place, however, to introduce corrections – ideally 
automatic -- when unexpected shocks start to generate systematic divergences between 
the pay-as-you-go asset and the IPD.    
 
In conclusion, more research is necessary to better understand how investors treat 
the IPD of a country and how they react to changes in its level under different economic 
and demographic environments.  At the same time, efforts to systematically estimate 
IPDs across countries should continue.  This information should be made available to 
policymakers and the general public.  What should be the appropriate reporting 
mechanism is a question still open to debate.  We argue, however, that there could be 
important advantages in terms of increased transparency and better fiscal discipline to 
making, at least the new IPD of reformed earnings related schemes with pay-as-you-go 
financing, fully explicit, by investing new contributions in appropriately indexed 
government bonds.  In this case, tolerance levels for the public debt would need to be 
reviewed, in part by looking at the pay-as-you-go asset.   The fiscal implications of this 
approach are explored in a companion paper.   
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Appendix I:  Dynamics of the Public Debt in Selected MENA Countries 
 
Figure A1: Fiscal Balance 
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Figure A2: Central Government Debt 
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